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THE CASE AGAINST POLICE MILITARIZATION
Eliav Lieblich* & Adam Shinar**
We usually think there is a difference between the police and the military.
Recently, however, the police have become increasingly militarized – a process
which is likely to intensify in coming years. Unsurprisingly, many find this process
alarming and call for its reversal. However, while most of the objections to police
militarization are framed as instrumental arguments, these arguments are unable to
capture the core problem with militarization.
This Article remedies this shortcoming by developing a novel and principled
argument against police militarization. Contrary to arguments that are preoccupied
with the consequences of militarization, the real problem with police militarization
is not that it brings about more violence or abuse of authority – though that may
very well happen – but that it is based on a presumption of the citizen as a threat,
while the liberal order is based on precisely the opposite presumption. A presump-
tion of threat, we argue, assumes that citizens, usually from marginalized commu-
nities, pose a threat of such caliber that might require the use of extreme violence.
This presumption, communicated symbolically through the deployment of
militarized police, marks the policed community as an enemy, and thereby excludes
it from the body politic. Crucially, the pervasiveness of police militarization has led
to its normalization, thus exacerbating its exclusionary effect. Indeed, whereas the
domestic deployment of militaries has always been reserved for exceptional times,
the process of police militarization has normalized what was once exceptional.
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INTRODUCTION
In late December 2014, Ferguson protesters posted an “eviction no-
tice” on the walls of the St. Louis Police Department, declaring that it was
“to be reclaimed by its citizens,” due to the transformation of the police
into an “occupying force.”1 In early December 2016, 2,000 veterans gath-
ered at the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in North Dakota to serve as
“human shields” for protesters against a plan to construct an oil pipeline
through the Reservation.2 The choice of language was striking: the terms
1. Jessica Chasmar, Ferguson Protesters Storm Police Headquarters in Downtown St. Louis,
WASH. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/31/
ferguson-protesters-storm-police-headquarters-in-d/.
2. Christopher Mele, Veterans to Serve as ‘Human Shields’ for Dakota Pipeline Protesters,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/us/veterans-to-serve-as-
human-shields-for-pipeline-protesters.html?_r=0.
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“occupation” and “human shields,” belong to the world of war rather than
to that of law enforcement and civil protest.3
This specific language, in both cases, does not necessarily reflect the
protesters’ belligerent attitude, nor is it coincidental. Rather, it responds to
and mirrors the long process of police militarization: a process whereby
police forces come to look and operate like military forces. Indeed, in
recent years, police forces across the globe—and particularly in North
America—have increasingly adopted military models.4
The United States is leading this process. In the last few decades,
U.S. police forces have acquired military weapons and equipment; set up
paramilitary units, often with the assistance of the military or former
soldiers; and embraced overall a militaristic mode of operation far removed
from the antiquated police officer “walking the beat.” This process is likely
to intensify in the near future. While some constraints on police militariza-
tion were put in place during the Obama presidency, the Trump adminis-
tration has repealed these restrictions, limited as they were.
That the police should not be an occupying force is intuitive, and
many object to police that are reminiscent of armed forces. However, this
intuition remains surprisingly unexplored. Indeed, various instrumental ar-
guments against police militarization have been advanced in recent years.
Specifically, critics have argued that police militarization is ineffective in
fighting crime, constitutes an inefficient allocation of resources, and incen-
tivizes police brutality at the expense of constitutional rights.5 However,
let us imagine well-regulated, well-trained, and well-supervised militarized
police that do not cause these adverse consequences. Is the problem with
militarized police only rooted in such consequences? Our answer is no.
Extant arguments against police militarization, correct as they may be, are
contingent and do not fully grasp the true nature of the problem.
Police militarization is part of a wider trend in which exceptional
measures—traditionally reserved for extreme emergencies—are normal-
ized.6 Originally established in the 1960s to ostensibly counter extreme
threats, militarization was empowered in recent decades through the “war”
discourse. From the “war on drugs” to the “war on terror,” militarization
saw a process of normalization that culminated in the camouflaged police-
troops and armored personnel carriers that deployed in the streets of Fer-
guson in 2014 and in the fields of Standing Rock in 2016.
3. See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2nd
ed., 2012); ADIL AHMAD HAQUE, LAW AND MORALITY AT WAR (2017).
4. See Jake Bleiberg, Here’s How Police in Canada are Becoming More Militarized, VICE
NEWS (Jan. 16, 2016), https://news.vice.com/article/heres-how-police-in-canada6’16-are-
becoming-more-militarized.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER (1995); PETER RAMSAY, THE INSE-
CURITY STATE: VULNERABLE AUTONOMY AND THE RIGHT TO SECURITY IN THE CRIMINAL
LAW (2012).
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Accordingly, this Article identifies the key problem of police milita-
rization in its normalization. But invoking normalization is not enough.
What exactly is being normalized? It is in this context that the Article
makes a novel contribution: suggesting that what is normalized is a pre-
sumption that the policed community is threatening. In other words, milita-
rization is wrong because it is based on a presumption of threat, while the
liberal order, if it is to have any substantive justification, must be based on
precisely the opposite. The assumption that others are threatening, in es-
sence, reduces the liberal order to a Hobbesian state of nature. The real
case against police militarization, then, does not lie with its consequences,
but rather its implicit reversal of one foundational aspect of the liberal
order.
Police militarization implies a presumption of threat because it ex-
hibits two salient characteristics. First, it is primarily preventive rather than
strictly reactive: deployment of militarized police reflects the anticipation of
extreme violence of the type that could require a forcible response. Sec-
ond, it is collective: since it is not (always) aimed at specific individuals, it
tends to rely on collective assumptions of the potential for violence. When
militarization becomes normalized, the presumption of threat becomes
normalized as well. This capacity for normalization is enhanced when it is
specifically police that becomes militarized, since police—contra the mili-
tary—are elements of the normal, rather than the exceptional, legal order.
Importantly, we do not argue that militarized forces actually fight the
civilian population, like militaries fight. Rather, we claim that the essential
effect of the presumption of threat—manifested in militarization—is sym-
bolic or expressive. Actual combat is not needed: the mere deployment of
militarized police carries the symbolic power to exclude the policed com-
munity from the political collective. This is because what is perceived as
military is generally understood to operate outside the state. We demon-
strate this excluding effect by invoking Carl Schmitt’s famous distinction
that possibility of combat—which militarization implies—creates a friend/
enemy distinction that constitutes (and delineates) the political collective.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers a definition of police
militarization as a process in which police adopt the appearance and behav-
ior that symbolizes military in a given political culture. It then distin-
guishes between exceptional and normalizing militarization, the latter
reflecting the process in which the exception becomes normalized.
Part II examines the process of police militarization, demonstrating
how it became normalized, from the “war on drugs,” through the “war on
terror,” and until this day. It ends by surveying the federal backlash against
militarization during the late Obama presidency, but notes that the at-
tempts to curtail militarization were neither principled nor sufficient, and
indeed have been largely reversed by the Trump Administration, which is
amenable to further militarization.
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Part III discusses the prevalent instrumental arguments against police
militarization, namely that militarization generates more violence. While
we are sympathetic to these arguments, they suffer from a shortcoming
common to consequentialist arguments: it is possible to counter them with
slight adjustments of our factual assumptions. We therefore argue that the
question of police militarization must be discussed on the non-instrumen-
tal, principled level.
Part IV presents the core of our case against police militarization. It
first lays down the argument that police militarization correlates with a
presumption of threat by virtue of the fact that it is based on preventive
and collective reasoning. It thereafter claims that the liberal order must be
based on the opposite presumption of non-threat: when a state assumes that
its citizens are threatening, it undermines its own authority and in fact
moves closer to totalitarianism. We then move to demonstrate that the
presumption of threat, manifested in the militarization of police, implies
the exclusion of the policed community from the body politic. Merely by
virtue of its symbolic power, militarization generates an excluding friend/
enemy distinction. Significantly, when the distinction is carried out by
police forces, the exclusion is more forcibly normalized, since the police are
part of the normal, rather than exceptional, order, which is the domain of
the military.
Part V addresses several possible challenges to our theory. In general,
these objections suggest that some of militarization’s ostensible benefits
might justify the exclusion that it creates. For instance, militarization
might contribute to officers’ protection; it might deter unlawful acts and
increase the public’s sense of security. However, we claim that these chal-
lenges are unconvincing, both empirically and on a principled level.
I. DEFINING MILITARIZATION
A. Militarization as a Symbolic Process
Militarization is the process by which an organization adopts the op-
eration mode of a military or embraces military values and culture.7 Ac-
cordingly, its primary problem-solving tools are borrowed from the
military (for example, its exercise of military technology and power, its
equipment, and its organizational and operational style). According to Pe-
ter Kraska, “[t]o militarize means adopting and applying the central ele-
ments of the military model to an organization or particular situation.
Police militarization, therefore, is simply the process whereby civilian po-
lice increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the military
model.”8
7. Peter B. Kraska, Enjoying Militarism: Political/Personal Dilemmas in Studying U.S. Police
Paramilitary Units, 13 JUSTICE Q. 405, 407 (1996) [hereinafter Kraska, Enjoying Militarism].
8. Peter B. Kraska, Militarization and Policing – Its Relevance to 21st Century Police, 1 PO-
LICING 1, 4 (2007).
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The word process is key. While the police, since their inception, have
always exhibited some militaristic tendencies, the phenomenon we wish to
address is their increasing militarization. We focus on the process in which
otherwise civilian law enforcement agencies come to resemble militarized
forces and the symbolic effect ushered by this transition. It is through this
process that the exceptional gradually becomes normalized.
Police militarization is usually viewed through the lens of four pa-
rameters: material, cultural, organizational, and operational.9 The material
lens focuses on the types of weapons, uniform, technology, and equipment
police use. The cultural lens examines the type of language, style, appear-
ance, and values used by the police. The organizational lens views the way
the police choose to organize themselves in terms of hierarchy, special
units, and forces. Finally, the operational lens looks at the patterns of po-
lice action in the various areas of its operation.
To be clear, we do not claim that police militarization amounts to a
wholesale importation of the military paradigm to law enforcement. To
the best of our knowledge, no police department has altered its rules of
engagement to reflect those of fighting military units. To us, however, mil-
itarization rests not on the actual adoption of military-style shoot-to-kill
rules of engagement, but rather on the cultural message it projects. From
the point of view of the citizen, what matters is not only what militarized
forces actually do, but also what they symbolize. This is why our definition
of militarization is not contingent upon the actual adoption of military
operational approaches across the board.
For this reason, when we discuss militarization, we generally refrain
from suggesting a checklist for defining the exact point at which a police
force becomes militarized. It is possible to discuss whether, for instance, a
blue-clad policewoman carrying a handgun would not be considered mili-
tarized, while the same policewoman wearing black and carrying an assault
weapon would. But to us, this would be overly technical and contingent.
We therefore opt to treat militarization as a cultural phenomenon in which
certain attributes are generally perceived by the public as reflecting milita-
rization. In sum, we address militarization as a symbolic process.
This is why, when we consider the four parameters that characterize
militarization, we focus on their observable external dimensions, which
can be viewed as an aggregate of characteristics that are perceived as milita-
rized in a specific culture. The paradigmatic example, of course, is the
prevalence of the now ubiquitous Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”)
units in the United States. Like military units, SWAT teams are equipped
with separate uniforms (urban tactical gear), full body armor, and Kevlar
helmets, and armed with automatic weapons, commonly in use in the mil-
itary,10 as well as other technologies such as sound suppressors, laser sights,
9. Id. at 3.
10. Kraska, Enjoying Militarism, supra note 7, at 410, 412.
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and semi-automatic and automatic shotguns. Some police units have ac-
quired armored personnel carriers.11 All of these were once exclusive to
the military, but are now routinely part of police equipment. SWAT teams
adopted military style governance and discipline, and their tactics, lan-
guage, and training differ from the ordinary police officer.12 Their opera-
tion looks more like, and indeed is, a paramilitary nature.13
B. Exceptional and Normalizing Militarization
We draw an essential distinction between the exception and the
norm. We might accept that in exceptional and well-defined situations of
emergency, some special police units are needed (for instance, the taking
of hostages during a terrorist attack, or when a grave and imminent threat
to life requires decisive action beyond the capabilities of simple police).
When militarized forces are utilized only in such situations, this is excep-
tional militarization. Exceptional militarization traces the classic distinction
in political theory between the normal state of affairs and the exceptional
emergency—the state of exception—in which extreme measures are
seemingly required.14 While exceptional militarization can be abused—
indeed, as we later discuss, the mere availability of such capabilities and the
incentive to acquire more of them results in a tendency to use them even
when not actually required—in well-defined emergencies, it could be
agreed upon that such forces might be required.
A different type of militarization is normalizing militarization. As a fac-
tual phenomenon, this occurs when militarized forces are increasingly
deployed in settings that are by no means exceptional, as the term is com-
monly understood. They can be used in day-to-day police activities, such
as serving search and arrest warrants, in drug raids, and in patrolling the
streets, often wearing full battle dress uniforms and carrying automatic
11. Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Nor-
malization of Paramilitary Units, 44 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 1, 3 (1997) [hereinafter Kraska & Kap-
peler, Militarizing American Police].
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id.
14. For a classic statement see CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS
ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5-15 (2005).
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weapons.15 These forces might also be deployed for “public order” pur-
poses in political demonstrations.16
While exceptional militarization raises a host of difficult questions,
our central focus is normalizing militarization. This is because a central claim
of this Article is that the key problem of militarization lies in its power to
exclude the policed community from the political collective. If this is true,
then it becomes clear that when militarization is normalized, so is the
exclusion.
In this regard, it is necessary to situate normalizing militarization
within the wider phenomenon identified by leading theorists as one in
which “states of exception,” or emergencies, are becoming the rule.17 If a
clean-cut distinction between the exceptional and the normal was once
thought to be possible, nowadays it has become muddled.18 Terrorism,
never-ending wars,19 wide-ranging national emergency measures,20 and
extraordinary international reactions to counter ongoing refugee influx21
are only some current aspects of this phenomenon. Indeed, normalization
of exceptional measures is dangerous because we lose sight of the fact that
it existed as an exception to begin with: measures that were once extreme
become the new normal. New and more extreme “exceptions” arise as
our standards become lower and lower.22
Police militarization squarely belongs within this general process.
The relationship between militarization and the “exception” is revealed
when we consider militarization’s potential for extreme physical violence.
15. Kraska, Enjoying Militarism, supra note 7, at 417; Peter B. Kraska, Militarizing Criminal
Justice: Exploring the Possibilities, 27 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 205, 212 (1999) [hereinafter Kraska,
Militarizing Criminal Justice]. According to a comprehensive report by the ACLU, 79 percent of
SWAT deployments are for serving warrants, an activity far removed from their original purpose
of handling terrorism, hostages, and barricaded suspects. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLICING 5
(2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-warcomeshome-report-webrel1
.pdf.
16. Norm Stamper, Paramilitary Policing from Seattle to Occupy Wall Street, THE NATION
(Nov. 9, 2011) http://www.thenation.com/article/paramilitary-policing-seattle-occupy-
wall-street/.
17. For a leading account see AGAMBEN, supra note 6, at 8-12.
18. See, e.g., id. at 9-12.
19. See Samuel Moyn, Civil Liberties and Endless War, DISSENT (2015), https://www.dis
sentmagazine.org/article/civil-liberties-and-endless-war.
20. See Be´ne´dicte Jeannerod, Dispatches: France’s Renewed Emergency Law a Recipe for Abuse,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/22/dispatches
-frances-renewed-emergency-law-recipe-abuse.
21. See, e.g., the U.N. Security Council’s reaction. S.C. Res 2240, (Oct. 9, 2015) (au-
thorizing States to board, in international waters, migrant vessels suspected of people smuggling).
22. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L. J. 1011 (1999); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liber-
alism, 98 YALE L. J. 1385 (1989). But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating
Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV.  605 (2003).
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When we normally think about police, we intuitively think about the
maintenance of law and order. We usually do not think about police in
terms of their capacity to kill. Giorgio Agamben famously connected the
increasing capacity (or power to decide) to kill and the erosion of the dis-
tinction between the normal and the exceptional, focusing on those who
are protected by the legal order and those excluded from it. In his pene-
trating analysis, states of exception were once distinct points in which sov-
ereignty moved from the regulation of law and politics into the regulation
of mere physical existence, or “bare life.”23 To Agamben, as the borders
between the normal and exceptional become blurred, the regulation of
bare life (and death) moves from the margins of the political realm to the
fore.24  In our context, while traditional police could (ideally) be seen as
regulators of human behavior, normalizing militarization—by virtue of its
capability to employ extreme deadly force—is an instance in which polic-
ing moves to regulate, at least in potential, bare life itself.25
Moreover, normalizing militarization cannot be separated from the
normalization of “war” in the general political discourse. War, of course, is
the quintessential military concept, packing almost mythical powers as the
ultimate state of exception.26 Once problems are reframed as “wars,”
hardline policy initiatives can garner more support.27 Once a certain situa-
tion is described as “war”—and therefore exceptional—the executive’s
margin of discretion grows.28 Accordingly, this elevation of threat could
partially account for the erosion of judicial review of militarized police
action, for instance.29
The metaphor of “war” proved key to the process of police militari-
zation. With the winding down of the Cold War, policymakers set their
23. AGAMBEN, supra note 6, at 9, 11-12.
24. See id. at 9.
25. Id. at 174 (describing situations in which police become the temporary sovereign, in
the sense that the decision to kill or not merely depends on “the civility and the ethical sense of
the police.”).
26. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 2-3 (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of
Chi. Press 2005) (2003) [hereinafter AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION] (“[W]ar is the opposite
of normal conditions.”). This is precisely the intuition behind Cicero’s famous quote “Silent
enim leges inter arma,” which translates to “war is excluded from the normal order as an
exception.”
27. See Erik Luna, Drug War and Peace, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813, 817 (2016).
28. See, e.g., Liam Braber, Comment, Korematsu’s Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of
Race and National Security, 47 VILL. L. REV. 451, 467-68 (2002).  For a discussion of the en-
hanced “power premium” of the executive in “exceptional” emergencies, see CARL SCHMITT,
LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY at 32 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., Duke Univ. Press 2004) (1932);
see also AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION, supra note 26, at 17.
29. See, e.g., David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural Fairness and
Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 240 (1994); Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of
War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1390-91 (1993); Steven
Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889,
907 (1987).
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sights on domestic problems, namely drugs.30 Soon enough, no longer was
there a drug “problem” or a crime “problem.” Those problems became
the “war on drugs” and the “war on crime.”31
The rhetorical tool of “war” in these contexts facilitated, indeed in-
centivized, police militarization. When the term is used by higher political
echelons, it permeates street-level discourse as well. Indeed, one of the
hallmarks of normalizing militarization is the infiltration of military lan-
guage into the day-to-day:32 sometimes police go as far as to describe city
streets as a “war zone,” borrowing directly from military language.33 In
terms of political discourse, the war metaphor served to elevate certain
categories of crime to existential national security threats, certain types of
criminals to enemies, and thus certain types of situations to exceptional
ones. However, since these exceptional situations are not well defined in
time or space, they are perpetuated and normalized.34
Last, the interrelationship among the war discourse, militarization,
and normalization cannot be viewed separately from the “war against ter-
ror,” in which the war discourse serves to justify continuous and global
forcible actions against ambiguous terrorist networks.35 Such actions—im-
plying a general erosion of boundaries—affect the way states approach ex-
ternal and internal threats.36 Police militarization should therefore be
viewed as part of a global process in which war becomes closer to law
enforcement,37 and law enforcement becomes closer to war, creating a sig-
nificant overlap between the two.
30. ETHAN A. NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 475 (1993) (“[W]here once anti-communists repre-
sented the principal moral imperative of U.S. foreign policy, drug enforcement and other crimi-
nal justice objective have emerged as the new moral imperatives.”), quoted in Kraska, Militarizing
Criminal Justice, supra note 15, at 206.
31. See, e.g., William N. Elwood, Declaring War on the Home Front: Metaphor, Presidents,
and the War on Drugs, 10 METAPHOR & SYMBOLIC ACTIVITY 93, 93 (1995); Susan Stuart, War as
Metaphor and the Rule of Law in Crisis: The Lessons We Should Have Learned from the War on Drugs,
36 S. ILL. U. L. J. 1, 3 (2011).
32. See STEPHEN GRAHAM, CITIES UNDER SIEGE: THE NEW MILITARY URBANISM,
xiii-xiv, 23 (2011).
33. Kraska & Kappeler, Militarizing American Police, supra note 11, at 9 (describing a state-
ment by the Fresno Police Department in a policing magazine).
34. See RAMSAY, supra note 6, at 213; Rens Van Munster, The War on Terrorism: When the
Exception Becomes the Rule, 17 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 141, 142 (2004).
35. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 715-29 (2004).
36. See, e.g., France: New Emergency Powers Threaten Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Nov. 24, 2015, 11:17 a.m.), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/24/france-new-emergency-
powers-threaten-rights; Cf. Matthew Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law
Enforcement and Counter-Terrorism after 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 377 (2009).
37. See, e.g., Gabriella Blum, The Individualization of War: From War to Policing in the Regu-
lation of Armed Conflicts, in LAW AND WAR 48, 50 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2014). Cf. Samuel
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We turn now to demonstrate how normalizing militarization came
about.
II. THE PROCESS OF POLICE MILITARIZATION
A. The War on Drugs and the
Shift from Exceptional to Normalizing Militarization
There was a time when there was crime without a war on crime; a
drug problem without a war on drugs. The war metaphor came about in
the wake of World War II, when leaders sought to rally public support to
solve social problems. The “war on crime” was coined by President John-
son in 1966, whereas the “war on drugs” began during the Nixon admin-
istration. Nixon called drugs “public enemy number one,” equating them
with “foreign troops on our shores.”38 President Reagan took it to another
level, declaring drugs to be a national security threat, a sentiment echoed
by Presidents Bush and Clinton.39
The war on drugs not only prioritized drug offenses, but also led to a
proliferation in police paramilitary units—namely SWAT units—and a
change in their character. SWAT teams are a relatively new creation. First
established in Philadelphia in 1964, they spread as a result of the Watts
Riots in 1965 and were perfected by would-be LAPD chief, Daryl
Gates.40 Whether in response to the police’s inadequate performance dur-
ing the riots, or as a product of racially charged moral panic, Gates became
convinced that the police force must familiarize itself with Guerilla war-
fare. He asked the military, the Marines in particular, for help, and they
obliged.41 The connection between SWAT and the military was tight from
the beginning. Not only were SWAT teams trained by the military, but
they also adopted military behavior and norms.42 At first, even the name
SWAT had a military orientation. Initially, Gates wanted SWAT to stand
for “Special Weapons Attack Teams.”43 However, the idea was rebuffed by
his supervisor, precisely because of the military connotation.44 Police do
not attack; they relate to their community.45 They are not meant to use
Moyn, Towards a History of Clean and Endless War, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 9, 2015, 9:45 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/26697/sanitizing-war-endlessness/.
38. Kraska, Militarizing Criminal Justice, supra note 15, at 209.
39. See id. at 210.
40. See RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF
AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES 53 (2014).
41. Id. at 53, 62.
42. See id. at 53.
43. Id. at 62.
44. Id.
45. BALKO, supra note 40, at 63 (citing Gates’s autobiography DARYL F. GATES WITH
DIANE K. SHAH, CHIEF: MY LIFE IN THE LAPD 131, 344 (1992)).
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preventive violence. The word “attack” was therefore replaced with “and
tactics.”46
SWAT teams were quickly established in most American cities.47
The creation of SWAT teams was a product of various material incentives.
Federal funds incentivized police to purchase military hardware, contribut-
ing to skewed police incentives. For example, provisions which allowed
the police to keep the proceeds of assets forfeited in anti-drug activities led
them to focus on drug offenses at the expense of other crimes.48 The
money obtained through this activity was often used to expand paramili-
tary units.49 Significantly, the Military Cooperation with Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1981 gave the military a foothold in domestic affairs in the
war on drugs, by authorizing it to make available to the police equipment,
information, research facilities, and access to military bases.50
Once a SWAT unit is in place, it will be used. Initially, SWAT teams
were limited to what we have described as exceptional militarization—
meaning, the occasional hostage situation, barricaded suspect, or the rare
act of terrorism. Over time, however, SWAT teams have expanded their
scope of activity. Now, whenever there is “high risk” police activity, a
term which itself has been expanded, these units are summoned.51 Since
the mid-1980s, militarized units are used in a wide spectrum of day-to-day
police activity. Most SWAT “call outs” in this period had nothing to do
with terrorism or hostages, but rather with serving warrants or drug raids,
which were redefined as high-risk activities.52 As Peter Kraska observed,
twenty percent of paramilitary units were used for routine patrol work.53
As a 2014 ACLU report states, 79 percent of police paramilitary activity is
46. Id. at 62.
47. By 1997, over 90 percent of American cities with a population over 50,000 had
SWAT teams. Seventy-five percent of cities under 50,000 people had SWAT teams. See John
Paul & Michael L. Birzer, The Militarization of the American Police Force: A Critical Assessment, 1
CRITICAL ISSUES IN JUST. AND POL. 15, 18 (2008). A comprehensive survey of 548 police
agencies in 1996 revealed that 89.4 percent had a police paramilitary unit; 20 percent of those
that did not have one were thinking or planning to create one. The police agencies surveyed all
served communities of more than 50,000 people. See Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 11, at 5-6. It
should be noted, however, that similar trends exist in police agencies in smaller localities. See
generally Peter B. Kraska & Louis J. Cubellis, Militarizing Mayberry and Beyond: Making Sense of
American Paramilitary Policing, 14 JUST. Q. 607 (1997).
48. See, e.g., Comprehensive Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, sec. 310 § 524(c),
98 Stat. 1837, 2052-53 (1984) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 524 (2015)); see also Bruce L.
Benson, et.al., Police Bureaucracies, Their Incentives, and the War on Drugs, 83 PUB. CHOICE 21
(1995).
49. BALKO, supra note 40, at 154, 244, 249.
50. 10 U.S.C § 271-74 (2016).
51. See Kraska & Kappeler, Militarizing American Police, supra note 11, at 4.
52. See Kraska & Cubellis, supra note 47, at 620. See also Kraska, Enjoying Militarism, supra
note 7, at 417; Kraska, Militarizing Criminal Justice, supra note 15, at 212.
53. Kraska & Kappeler, Militarizing American Police, supra note 11, at 9.
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now devoted to serving warrants, one of the more routine types of police
deployment.54 The availability of military hardware led police to use heli-
copters, camouflage, and battering rams, even when the suspicion
amounted to little more than growing marijuana.55 Two recent appellate
decisions have criticized police departments that used SWAT teams even
for regulatory inspections of barbershops and nightclubs.56 The legacy of
the war on drugs can thus be described as a key moment in which the shift
from exceptional to normalizing militarized police gained ground.
B. Normalizing Militarization and Physical Transformation:
Personnel and Equipment
The proliferation of militarization was accompanied and enhanced by
the increasing interaction between police and the military in training, per-
sonnel, and equipment. Military training and the increasing number of ex-
military personnel in the ranks of the police augment the process of nor-
malizing militarization, while the acquisition and deployment of military
hardware affects the symbolic representation of policing.
A useful point of departure is, again, the establishment of SWAT in
Los Angeles. As aforementioned, the initial SWAT was the result of coop-
eration with the Marines and was inspired by guerrilla warfare in the Viet-
nam War.57 Soon thereafter, elite military units such as SEALS and
Rangers began to train police officers throughout the country.58 This
training normalizes militarization not only directly through SWAT units,
but also indirectly because “ordinary” police units are trained by their
SWAT colleagues.59
Not only does the military train the police, many veterans have
joined the police after their discharge, partly due to government incen-
tives. The Community Oriented Policing Services program (COPS) in the
Department of Justice, a program “advancing the practice of community
54. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 15, at 5. Although data is not availa-
ble for every state, evidence suggests that many such deployments are for serving warrants for
nonviolent crimes. Cadman Robb Kiker III, From Mayberry to Ferguson: The Militarization of
American Policing Equipment, Culture, and Mission, 71 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. ONLINE 282, 288
(2015).
55. See BALKO, supra note 40, at 136.
56. Berry v. Leslie, 767 F.3d 1144, 1153-54 (11th Cir. 2014); Club Retro, LLC. v.
Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 214 (5th Cir. 2009).
57. Karan R. Singh, Treading the Thin Blue Line: Military Special-Operations Trained Police
SWAT Teams and the Constitution, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 673, 676 (2001).
58. Kraska, Enjoying Militarism, supra note 7, at 420; Singh, supra note 57, at 687, n. 105.
In one survey, Kraska found that 43 percent of SWAT teams polls reported receiving training
from active duty military special operations unit. Kraska & Kappelar, supra note 11, at 11.
59. Kraska found that 63 percent of police paramilitary units train other police agencies,
indicating that military style tactics are permeating ordinary police units. Id.
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policing,”60 allocates millions of dollars every year ($14 billion since 1994)
in grants that are used to defray the costs of police officers.61 In 2012, the
program restricted the hiring of non-military personnel.62 Although the
restriction was repealed a year later, it indicates an underlying sentiment
that the police can benefit from a military mindset by having veterans serve
among its ranks, thus infusing the police with a military culture.63 “Com-
munity policing,” for which veterans are hired by the police, is a vague
term.64 Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that much of the COPS money
went into establishing SWAT teams.65 Sustaining militarization through
ex-military personnel and military training that eventually permeates to
“ordinary” police units, has a strong, systemic, normalizing function.
Normalizing militarization led to the physical transformation of po-
lice forces throughout the United States. As aforementioned, after the
Cold War, the military began selling (or donating) weaponry, surplus, and
technology to the police (for example armored personnel carriers, M16
rifles, and night vision technology).66
While the requirement to pay the military usually discouraged police
departments from spending exorbitant sums on equipment they probably
did not need,67 two federal programs operated by the DOD, program
112268 and program 1033,69 made such acquisitions easier. Program 1122
allows local law enforcement agencies to purchase military equipment at
60. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, http://www
.cops.usdoj.gov/about (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
61. Id.
62. Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
870, 928 (2015).
63. Id. During the Clinton Administration, Congress passed “Troops to Cops” legislation,
which gave police departments up to $25,000 for every ex-military soldier they hired. The
program is no longer in operation. See FEDERAL GRANTS WIRE, Troops to Cops, https://www
.federalgrantswire.com/troops-to-cops.html#.WqK6DhPwagR.
64. See generally STEVE HERBERT, CITIZENS, COPS, AND POWER: RECOGNIZING THE
LIMITS OF COMMUNITY (2006).
65. In Wisconsin, for example, more than half of the state’s SWAT teams were created
since COPS began, and many of those teams had sprung up in small towns, some of which
under 10,000 residents, where military style policing was probably unneeded. BALKO, supra note
40, at 221.
66. Peter B. Kraska, Questioning the Militarization of U.S. Police: Critical versus Advocacy
Scholarship, 9 POLICING AND SOC’Y 141, 143 (1999).
67. David B. Kopel & Paul M. Blackman, Can Soldiers Be Peace Officers? The Waco Disaster
and the Militarization of American Law Enforcement, 30 AKRON L. REV. 619, 624 (1997).
68. National Defense Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 1122, 107 Stat.
1548 (1993).
69. National Defense Authorization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-210, § 1033, 110 Stat.
2422 (1996).
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subsidized rates,70 including weapons and surveillance equipment.71 Pro-
gram 1033 is the more ambitious of the two. Passed by Congress in 1997,
it is a program run by the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Ser-
vices.72 The program allows for surplus weapons and gear to be transferred
to local law enforcement agencies, free of charge.73 Although this made
things easier for the police, the maintenance costs still made the transaction
cost for some agencies prohibitive.74
Still, in its first three years, Program 1033 handled 3.4 million orders
for military gear from 11,000 police agencies. In 2005, the number of
police agencies participating in the program climbed to 17,000.75  Since its
inception, the program has disbursed over $5 billion worth of military
equipment.76 As the United States began to withdraw from Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, transfers to local police increased significantly.77 In 2014 alone,
local law enforcement agencies received nearly $1 billion worth of military
equipment.78 Importantly, most of the applications come from small and
medium sized police agencies, which are not as well funded as larger agen-
cies, which presumably already possess such equipment.79
The possibility of free military equipment created an arms race, so to
speak, among police agencies. Small agencies saw that larger agencies were
arming themselves and did not want to be left behind. Militarization thus
became a matter of prestige.80 Indeed, the change in the physical appear-




72. Taylor Wofford, How America’s Police Became an Army: The 1033 Program, NEWSWEEK
(August 13, 2014, 10:47 PM), http://europe.newsweek.com/how-americas-police-became-
army-1033-program-264537?rm=eu.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Kevin P. Craver, McHenry County, police deal with hidden cost of government
surplus of military supplies, vehicles, NORTHWEST HERALD (January 8, 2015), http://www.nwher-
ald.com/2014/09/24/mchenry-county-police-deal-with-hidden-cost-of-government-surplus-
of-military-supplies-vehicles/axo0yhn/.
75. BALKO, supra note 40, at 210.
76. Alex S. Vitale, Trump Is Trying to Militarize the Police. It Won’t Make Us Any Safer,
FORTUNE (August 29, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/29/trump-military-police-
equipment-1033-program-obama/.
77. See Geoffrey Coleman Wickes, Demystifying “Militarization”: A Partial Analysis of
the Impact of the U.S. Department of Defense’s “1033” Equipment Transfer Program on Police
Office Safety Outcomes 11-12 (2015) (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Georgetown University).
78. Joseph Trevithick, Trump Ends Restrictions on Giving Surplus Military Gear to Cops, The
Drive (August 28, 2017), http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/13880/trump-ends-
restrictions-on-giving-surplus-military-gear-to-cops.
79. See Paulina Firozi, Police forces pick up surplus military supplies, USA TODAY (June 17,
2014, 12:16 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/15/local-law-
enforcement-agencies-surplus-military-equipment/10286485/.
80. BALKO, supra note 40, at 210.
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ance of police necessarily led to a symbolic change: from a policing force
involved in law enforcement to a militarized force standing ready for the
possibility of combat.
C. The “War on Terror” and Crowd Control as the
Epitome of Normalization
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, brought both con-
tinuity and change: continuity, because in many ways militarization in-
creased and, in certain respects, became more normalized;81 change,
because in recent years there is also a realization, at least among some, that
there is something deeply troubling about this process.
As part of the “Global War on Terror,” virtually every law enforce-
ment agency was enlisted in the war effort. The establishment of the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) was one major consequence of the
terrorist attacks. The DHS, with its $66 billion budget for the fiscal year
2017,82 spends much of that money in the form of grants to local law
enforcement agencies that in turn serve to procure military equipment.83
DHS grants dwarf other funding programs. Through various federal
programs, billions of dollars are transferred from the federal government to
the local police level, mostly by the DHS.84 Between 2001 and 2011, the
DHS gave $34 billion in anti-terror grants, many of which went to un-
likely places such as Fargo, North Dakota, or Canyon County, Idaho,
hardly prime terrorist targets.85 Many of these places, unsurprisingly,
chose to buy military equipment.86 It did not take long for militarized
police, ostensibly meant to counter grave security threats, to pop up in a
quintessentially democratic setting: political demonstrations. Those were
now subject to militarized crowd control, perhaps the epitome of normal-
izing militarization.
Even before 9/11, militarized police, together with the National
Guard, were sent to quell the demonstrations in Seattle surrounding the
1999 WTO ministerial conference as part of the anti-globalization cam-
81. Kiker, supra note 54, at 287.
82. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, BUDGET-IN-BRIEF, FISCAL YEAR
2017 1 (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY2017_BIB-MASTER
.pdf.
83. Kiker, supra note 54, at 288.
84. To be sure, not all of the money goes toward police militarization. Some of it goes
toward hiring personnel and improving interstate coordination, among other things. See Har-
mon, supra note 62, at 884.
85. BALKO, supra note 40, at 254.
86. For example, Keene, New Hampshire, chose to buy a Bearcat vehicle, which is an
armored personnel carrier used by the military. Some residents resisted. One resident told inves-
tigative journalist Radley Balko that “[t]he police are already brutal. . . [t]he last thing they
need is this big piece of military equipment to make them think they’re soldiers.” The city went
ahead anyway. Id. at 254.
2017-2018] The Case Against Police Militarization 121
paign, sparking what became infamously known as the “Battle in Seat-
tle.”87 The police changed to full riot gear with helmets, arming
themselves with pepper spray, tear gas, stun grenades, and even rubber
bullets.88 An internal investigation by Seattle police commended its per-
formance, referring, inter alia, to police officers as operating on the “front
line.”89 Others, however, thought differently. Seattle Chief of Police
Norm Stamper resigned over the handling of the demonstrations, referring
to his performance as “disastrous.”90
Smaller scale demonstrations happened in the 2009 Pittsburgh G-20
Summit. In Pittsburgh, like Seattle, police used tear gas (even firing it into
dorm rooms), sound canons, bean bags, and rubber bullets.91 Moreover,
police in Pittsburgh wore paramilitary garb, camouflage, and combat
boots.92 This is hardly the gear required for urban settings, where camou-
flage uniforms stand out more than conceal.93 This gives rise to the suspi-
cion that such gear is meant to signify rather than to serve an operational
function.
Overall, when facing large events with the possibility of protests, mil-
itarized police became the norm.94 To us, most important is that the ap-
pearance of militarized police for crowd control signifies the normalization
of militarization. Originally conceived to operate in states of exception,
87. The “Battle in Seattle,” a military term, has become the accepted name to describe
the events during the WTO conference. A movie titled “Battle in Seattle” was released in 2007.
Battle in Seattle (Redwood Palm Pictures 2007). The former Seattle police chief has referred to
it in these militaristic terms. See Former Seattle Police Chief Norm Stamper on Paramilitary Policing
From WTO to Occupy Wall Street, Democracy Now! (November 17, 2011), http://www
.democracynow.org/2011/11/17/paramilitary_policing_of_occupy_wall_street. Besides the pol-
ice, the mayor also declared a state of emergency; see also Seattle Municipal Archives, World Trade
Organization Protests in Seattle, http://www.seattle.gov/cityarchives/exhibits-and-education/
digital-document-libraries/world-trade-organization-protests-in-seattle.
88. Patrick F. Gillham & Gary T. Marx, Complexity and Irony in Policing and Protesting: The
World Trade Organization in Seattle, 27 SOC. JUST. 212, 217 (2000).
89. SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T AFTER ACTION REPORT: WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 29-DECEMBER 3, 1999 3
(April 4, 2000), http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/wto/wto_aar.pdf.
90. Stamper, supra note 16; Sam Howe Verhovek, Seattle Police Chief Resigns in Aftermath of
Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 1999).
91. BALKO, supra note 40, at 294.
92. Id. at 293-94.
93. Id. at 293.
94. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, Scenes from St. Paul – Democracy Now’s Amy Goodman
Arrested, SALON (September 2, 2008), http://www.salon.com/2008/09/01/protests_3/. This is
how journalist Glenn Greenwald described the 2008 GOP Convention in St. Paul: “St. Paul was
the most militarized I have ever seen an American city be, even more so than Manhattan in the
week of 9/11 — with troops of federal, state and local law enforcement agents marching around
with riot gear, machine guns, and tear gas cannisters, shouting military chants and marching in
military formations. Humvees and law enforcement officers with rifles were posted on various
buildings and balconies.” Id.
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militarized forces now routinely appear in the most fundamental of demo-
cratic activities.
D. The Occupy-Ferguson Backlash and the Trump Administration
The public outcry following the heavily militarized police reaction to
the 2011 Occupy protests and the 2014 Ferguson demonstrations provoked
the official acknowledgement of the problems of unchecked militarization.
However, as we argue below, the preliminary steps taken were unlikely to
adequately address the problem and indeed have been reversed by the
Trump administration.
Militarized police were on full display during the Occupy move-
ment. Reflecting on police militarization during Occupy Wall Street, for-
mer Seattle Chief Stamper wrote:
[T]he police response to the Occupy movement, most disturb-
ingly visible in Oakland—where scenes resembled a war
zone. . . brings into sharp relief the acute and chronic problems
of American law enforcement. Seattle might have served as a
cautionary tale, but instead, US police forces have become in-
creasingly militarized, and it’s showing in cities everywhere . . .
Such agencies inevitably view protesters as the enemy. And
young people, poor people and people of color will forever ex-
perience the institution as an abusive, militaristic force—not
just during demonstrations but every day, in neighborhoods
across the country.95
Stamper was not alone. Others have equated police response to
protestors as militarized or paramilitary, tracing it to the war on drugs and
funding programs like COPS and Program 1033.96
Recently, the images from Ferguson and later Standing Rock
brought police militarization to every home.97 Battle-ready police in com-
bat uniforms, with weapons pointed at citizens and armored personnel
carriers alarmed many observers.98 While disconcerting, Ferguson also sig-
95. Stamper, supra note 16.
96. See, e.g., Radley Balko, A Decade After 9/11, Police Departments are Increasingly Milita-
rized, HUFFINGTON POST (September 12, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/
12/police-militarization-9-11-september-11_n_955508.html; Erik Kain, Police Militarization in
the Decade Following 9/11, FORBES (September 12, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erik-
kain/2011/09/12/police-militarization-in-the-decade-following-911/#48ecc7eb4934.
97. See Glenn Greenwald, The Militarization of U.S. Police: Finally Dragged into the Light by
the Horrors of Ferguson, THE INTERCEPT (August 14, 2014), https://theintercept.com/2014/08/
14/militarization-u-s-police-dragged-light-horrors-ferguson/; Julia Carrie Wong & Sam Levin,
Standing Rock Protesters Hold Out Against Extraordinary Police Violence, THE GUARDIAN (Novem-
ber 29, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/29/standing-rock-protest-
north-dakota-shutdown-evacuation.
98. See, e.g., Stephanie Condon, What Can Washington Do About Militarized Police Forces?,
CBS NEWS (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/after-missouri-what-can-
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naled a potential for change. After Ferguson, both state and federal govern-
ments seem to have started to recognize the potential harms of the process.
A 2015 report submitted by the government-appointed Ferguson
Commission99 criticized the police response and gear as “military-style,”
recommending that “St. Louis law enforcement agencies should aim to
have a more human, non-militarized, proportional response to future pro-
test or demonstration activity in the region.”100 It further issued a call to
“[d]irect the state to cease providing, and local departments to cease using,
militarized weaponry that does not align with a use of force continuum
that authorizes only the minimal amount of force necessary.”101
The Ferguson Commission Report was preceded by a Department
of Justice Investigation into the police response in Ferguson.102 Essentially
calling to halt normalizing militarization, the DOJ report found that the
Use of military weapons and sniper deployment atop military
vehicles was inappropriate, inflamed tensions, and created fear
among demonstrators. Agencies possessing military-type equip-
ment or weaponry should restrict its deployment to limited sit-
uations in which the use of the equipment or weapons is clearly
justified . . . The equipment and weapons should be kept out of
sight and not be used routinely or in the absence of special
circumstances.103
The Report stated that “[f]or persons who would have seen the
SWAT teams arrive, the action would have resembled that of ‘soldiers ar-
riving at a war zone.’”104 For example, whereas the police use an armored
personnel carrier, ostensibly to protect police officers, members of the
community often referred to them as tanks, thus contributing to the per-
washington-do-about-militarized-police-forces; Rand Paul, We Must Demilitarize the Police,
TIME (Aug. 14, 2014), http://time.com/3111474/rand-paul-ferguson-police/; Paul D.
Shinkman, Ferguson and the Militarization of Police, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/08/14/ferguson-and-the-shocking-nature-of-us-
police-militarization.
99. Missouri Governor Jay Nixon appointed the Commission to conduct a “thorough,
wide-ranging and unflinching study of the social and economic conditions that impede progress,
equality and safety in the St. Louis region.” See Miss. Exec. Order No. 14-15 (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://www.sos.mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2014/eo14_15.
100. THE FERGUSON COMMISSION, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON: A PATH TOWARD
RACIAL EQUITY 30 (2015), http://3680or2khmk3bzkp33juiea1.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/
wp-content/uploads/2015/09/101415_FergusonCommissionReport.pdf.
101. Id. at 65.
102. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES
CRITICAL RESPONSE INITIATIVE, AFTER-ACTION ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICE RESPONSE TO
THE AUGUST 2014 DEMONSTRATIONS IN FERGUSON, MISSOURI 43-49 (2015), http://ric-zai-
inc.com/Publications/cops-p317-pub.pdf [hereinafter DOJ REPORT].
103. Id. at xvii.
104. Id. at 57. One interviewee said that “[i]t feels like we are fighting a war.” Id.
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ception of the police as military.105 The importance of these observations,
as we note later,106 is precisely in its recognition of the effect of militariza-
tion on the perception of police by the policed community.
The DOJ recommendations did not go unheeded. On January 16,
2015, President Obama issued Executive Order 13688 titled “Federal Sup-
port for Local Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition.”107 Acknowl-
edging the contribution of federal funds to keeping “the American people
safe,” the Order notes that the government “must ensure that careful at-
tention is paid to standardizing procedures” regarding the provision of mil-
itary equipment and that more must be done to ensure that law
enforcement agencies are aware of the civil rights concerns resulting from
militarization.108 To that end, the Order established an inter-agency work-
ing group tasked with, among others, compiling a list of controlled equip-
ment that could be given to the police, but with additional oversight on
the allocation, use, and training of agencies that receive controlled
equipment.
Pursuant to the Executive Order, the Law Enforcement Equipment
Working Group submitted its recommendations in May 2015.109 It recom-
mended, among other things, that law enforcement agencies be prohibited
from acquiring certain equipment, chosen both because of its propensity
for overuse or misuse, and because its militaristic nature undermines com-
munity trust in the police.110 The acquisition of other equipment will be
controlled, meaning that agencies may acquire them, subject to further
oversight, assurances, and certification. Moreover, agencies must employ
protocols on the use, supervision, evaluation, accountability, transparency,
and operation of the equipment.111
105. Id. at 55. “One community member said, ‘[t]he tanks looked like the police were
invading.’ . . . [A]nother citizen stated, ‘To see a tank riding down West Florissant was heart-
breaking; it was heartbreaking that they had to respond to us that way.’” Id.
106. See infra Part IV.
107. Exec. Order No. 13688, 80 Fed. Reg. 3451 (Jan. 16, 2015).
108. As per the Order, agencies must receive proper training, “including training on the
protection of civil rights and civil liberties, and are aware of their obligations under Federal
nondiscrimination laws when accepting such equipment.” Id.
109. LAW ENFORCEMENT WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO EXEC-
UTIVE ORDER 13688 FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT AC-
QUISITION (2015), http://sheriffs.org/sites/default/files/LE-Equipment-WG-Final-Report.pdf.
110. Id. at 12-13. The working group’s recommendations, which went into effect on Oc-
tober 1, 2015, placed the following equipment on the list of prohibited equipment: tracked
armored vehicles, weaponized aircraft, vessels, and vehicles of any kind, firearms of .50 caliber
and higher, ammunition of .50 caliber and higher, grenade launchers, bayonets, and certain
camouflage uniforms. Id.
111. Id. Manned aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, wheeled armored and tactical vehicles,
certain firearms and ammunition, explosives, battering rams, riot batons, and helmets were
placed on the controlled list, meaning that more oversight will be instituted. An important limi-
tation on controlled equipment was that agencies will have to justify their request, explaining the
need and how the equipment will be used. Id. at 26.
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While the Order limits militarization to an extent, police can still
purchase the prohibited equipment or bypass the extra oversight provided
for controlled equipment if the acquisition is not made through federal
programs or federal funds. Moreover, the Executive Order has sparked
criticism from both the House of Representatives and police sheriffs.112
This is significant, since Executive Orders can be changed relatively
easily.113
And indeed, during his campaign, President Trump pledged to re-
verse the post-Ferguson restrictions on militarization.114 Unsurprisingly,
the National Fraternal Order of the Police—the largest police union in the
United States—expected him to deliver: their first “potential action” for
Trump’s first 100 days was to “rescind Executive Order 13688.”115 Upon
assuming office, President Trump quickly delivered. On August 28, 2017,
he signed Executive Order 13809, revoking both Executive Order 13688
and the recommendations issued pursuant to Executive Order 13688,116
thus restoring Program 1033 to its scope prior to Ferguson.
III. KEY INSTRUMENTAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST
POLICE MILITARIZATION
Until now we have described the process of police militarization in
the United States, demonstrating how police embarked on a militarization
spree since the 1960s, ushering a move from exceptional to normal milita-
rization. Still, it is possible to claim that militarization, on its own, should
not bother us too much if it brings about good results. Consequentialists
might argue that if militarized police are supervised and disciplined not to
use excessive force, perform efficiently overall, prevent crime, and keep
communities safe, this is all that matters.
As discussed later, we argue that even if militarized police could
achieve these goals, militarization is inherently problematic from a non-
112. The House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving of the Order, stating
that the terrorist attack in San Bernardino demonstrated that stripping police of military equip-
ment will leave communities vulnerable to acts of terrorism and similar events. H.R. 559, 114th
Cong. (2015), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hres559/text. Similarly, police
sheriffs have criticized the Order, saying that much of the equipment is defensive in nature.
Adam Shaw, Outrage as Military Vehicles, Equipment Taken From Officers In Wake Of Obama Order,
FOX NEWS (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/11/23/outrage-as-
military-vehicles-equipment-taken-from-officers-in-wake-obama-order.html.
113. See Julia Edwards, Exclusive: White House to Review Ban on Military Gear for Police –
Police Leaders, REUTERS (July 21, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-gear-
exclusive-idUSKCN1012KW.
114. Jon Swaine & Ben Jacobs, Donald Trump Backs Return of Military Weaponry to Police
Forces, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/aug/
22/donald-trump-return-military-equipment-police.
115. NATIONAL FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION: THE
FIRST 100 DAYS (2016), https://fop.net/CmsDocument/Doc/TrumpFirst100Days.pdf.
116. See Exec. Order No. 13809, 82 Fed. Reg. 41499 (Aug. 28, 2017).
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consequentialist perspective. Nonetheless, in this Part we detail numerous
instrumental arguments that have been made against police militarization.
To be clear, we do not believe that these arguments fail. In fact, we (gener-
ally) agree with them, and some have also been empirically substanti-
ated.117 However, like all instrumental objections, they are factually
contingent, as it is possible to imagine a world where the concerns are met
satisfactorily. Therefore, in this Section we elaborate on the instrumental
arguments against militarization not only to complete the picture, but also
to underscore, in general, why a non-consequentialist, normative argu-
ment is required.
A. Militarization Undermines Trust and Does Not Reduce Violence
The main instrumental argument against police militarization is that
it is inefficient since it only increases violence or undermines police legiti-
macy. When citizens believe the police will respond with violence, there
could be an escalation. A display of force could catalyze both sides and
increase the level of violence.  For instance, the “war on drugs” ultimately
exemplifies how normalized militarization is in its essence a cycle of vio-
lence. A heavy handed approach to narcotics crimes led to more turf wars
among drug dealers, which led to more violence, leading to public pres-
sure on police to get even tougher, leading to police wanting more author-
ity and equipment, and consequently to use even more force.118 At the
same time, the war on drugs showed poor results, with scholars, judges,
police officers, and policymakers hailing it a failure, given the billions of
dollars spent, the lives lost, the devastating effects on minorities, and the
rise in incarceration.119
Militarization can thus create conflict instead of defusing it, contrib-
uting to loss of trust in the police.120 Trust can be replaced by fear or
hatred,121 which in turn decreases the legitimacy of police.122 For instance,
the DOJ report stated that militarization often brings about “unintended
consequences” that galvanize a negative reaction and aggravate community
117. See Casey Delehanty et al., Militarization and Police Violence, the Case of the 1033 Pro-
gram, RES. & POL., Apr.- Jun. 2017.
118. BALKO, supra note 40, at 97. See also Daryl Meeks, Police Militarization in Urban Areas:
The Obscure War Against the Underclass, 35 THE BLACK SCHOLAR 33, 38 (2006).
119. See, e.g., DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE
POLITICS OF FAILURE (1997); CLARENCE LUSAN, PIPE DREAM BLUES: RACISM AND THE WAR
ON DRUGS (1999); JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE
CAN DO ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS (2001); Lawrence D.
Bobo & Victor Thompson, Unfair by Design: The War on Drugs, Race, and the Legitimacy of the
Criminal Justice System, 73 Soc. Res. 445 (2006); Lisa D. Moore & Amy Elkavich, Who’s Using
and Who’s Doing Time: Incarceration, the War on Drugs, and Public Health, 98 Am. J. Pub. Health
782 (2008).
120. Paul & Birzer, supra note 47, at 23.
121. Id.
122. Harmon, supra note 62, at 921.
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concerns about the police and the justice system.123 While a voluminous
literature examines police legitimacy and its relationship with compli-
ance,124 scant attention is devoted, if at all, to how militarization generates
fear among the population, which in turn affects the legitimacy of the
police. As Rachel Harmon argues, fear of the police has substantial costs
that are rarely, if ever, factored into the cost-benefit equation.125 When
the police patrol the streets with armored personnel carriers, some of
which are mine-resistant; when the police use military weapons, helicop-
ters, bayonets, or disperse riots with various grenades; when SWAT teams
cover themselves with masks to conceal their identity, they create a shock
and awe effect that is designed to create a menacing presence.126
A possible reply is that the use of military equipment and military
weapons could decrease the overall level of force exercised by police in that
the mere display of power will discourage resistance. We address this spe-
cific argument for deterrence below.127 For now, it suffices to point out
that there will be times when the presence of the equipment and weapons
will increase the severity of force.128 For example, military weapons will be
used for operations that in the past relied on less powerful weapons. An
example is the increasing reliance on SWAT teams to execute warrants that
in the past were executed by ordinary units, or the use of armored military
vehicles where none were used in the past.129
Militarization creep also contributes to these adverse effects. Once
one starts using militarized police for one thing, for example drugs, one
may start using it for other things, for example counter-terrorism and ulti-
mately for day-to-day policing.130 Once military means are available, more
initiatives using those means will be undertaken.131 We pointed this out in
the context of call out rates.132 Over time, paramilitary police units have
been increasingly dispatched, whereas the rise in violent crime could not,
123. DOJ REPORT, supra note 102, at 53.
124. See, e.g., Mengyan Dai et al., Procedural Justice During Police-Citizen Encounters: The
Effects of Process-Based Policing on Citizen Compliance and Demeanor, 39 J. CRIM. JUST. 159 (2011);
Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public
Support for Policing, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 513 (2003); Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy,
593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 84 (2004).
125. Harmon, supra note 62, at 922-32.
126. Id. at 924.
127. See infra Part V.
128. Harmon, supra note 62, at 920.
129. See supra Part II C.
130. Al Baker, When the Police Go Military, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2011) (“. . . the problem
is, if you have those kinds of specialized units, that you hunt for appropriate settings to use
them”).
131. See Daniel M. Stewart, D & Willard M. Oliver, The Adoption of Homeland Security
Initiatives in Texas Police Departments: A Contextual Perspective, CRIM. JUST. REV., 2014, at 9.
132. See supra Part II C.
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in itself, explain the increased deployments.133 Thus the rise of police mili-
tarization cannot be explained as a “rational” response to increased crime
rates. Once the equipment is there, police will want to use it. This is of
course inefficient economically, and also contributes to heightened
tensions.
A further problem, which might also generate more violence, relates
to the changed self-perception of the militarized police officer. As Camp-
bell and Campbell point out, the roles of an infantryman and a patrol of-
ficer are different. When the police officer’s job is framed in military
terms, discretion about arrests and the appropriate level of force give way
to aggressive intimidation rather than to the delicate problem solving re-
quired from the police officer.134
Similarly, as Benjamin Beede argued, the military is usually ill-
equipped for tasks other than war, such as civilian law enforcement.135
When law enforcement is militarized, it might become clumsy and ineffi-
cient because of vastly different training. Consequently, some argue that
soldiers are generally less flexible than civilian police and are prone to over-
reaction when dealing with the public.136 Soldiers are perceived, also by
themselves, as “warriors,” whereas police officers are in the business of law
enforcement.137 Conflating the two thus invites a heightened risk of police
violence where police officers now behave in a military or quasi-military
fashion.
To sum up, the increased likelihood of using force, the tendency to
frame social problems as wars, the addition of manpower through federal
budgets that goes toward increased militarization, and the transfer of mili-
tary equipment has led observers to argue that militarization has caused
police to become more aggressive and violent, often with dramatic conse-
quences to policed communities.138 These consequences are enhanced in
133. Kraska & Cubellis, supra note 47, at 621-22.
134. Donald J. Campbell & Kathleen M. Campbell, Soldiers as Police Officers/Police Officers
as Soldiers: Role Evolution and Revolution in the United States, 36 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y. 327,
341-42 (2010). A caveat must be inserted here: while the traditional perception indeed views
soldiering (as a profession) as differing substantially from policing, nowadays – in the age of
asymmetric conflict and in instances of prolonged occupation – professional soldiering requires
also delicate policing proficiencies. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY & U.S. MARINE CORPS,
COUNTERINSURGENCY, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (2006). This realization highlights our gen-
eral argument that such instrumental arguments cannot be the final word on police
militarization.
135. Benjamin R. Beede, The Roles of Paramilitary and Militarized Police, 36 J. POL. & MIL.
SOC. 53, 54 (2008).
136. See generally Rachel Bronson, When Soldiers Become Cops, 81 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 122,
123 (2002).
137. Beede, supra note 135, at 58.
138. See generally BALKO, supra note 40; Cops or Soldiers?, THE ECONOMIST (March 22,
2014), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21599349-americas-police-have-
become-too-militarised-cops-or-soldiers (“Often these no-knock raids take place at night . . .
They can go horribly wrong . . . Officers can get jumpy and shoot unnecessarily, or acciden-
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marginalized communities, which see the most militarized forces.139 If po-
licing depends on receiving the cooperation of the policed community and
maintaining good relations with the community, then in communities that
feel targeted by militarization, police will naturally be approached with
suspicion or not approached at all, thus undermining their effectiveness.
B. The Contingency of Instrumental Arguments
Taking these arguments into account sheds a different light on the
security-rights tradeoff. Militarization is often promoted by asserting that
although rights are important, personal and community safety eradicating
crime can and should override the rights of criminals.140 But if militariza-
tion makes us less safe because it tramples on the individual rights of many,
because it generates fear and alienation between the community and the
police, because it leads citizens to distrust their police, and because in some
cases it is ineffectual in reducing crime, then the security-rights tradeoff is
false.
Nevertheless, as compelling as these arguments are, they do not offer
a principled objection. This is because theoretically, instrumental argu-
ments can be met with counterarguments that invoke the option of tight-
ening secondary norms. Responding to instrumentalist concerns, the
problem of militarization can presumably be solved with better regulation
and supervision. If we just make slight adjustments, the argument goes, the
problems might be fixed. Non-reduction of violence and undermining of
trust can be dealt with through more training, discipline, and enhanced
police-public relations. Self-perception of police can be controlled through
education and is not a salient issue since soldiers also engage in policing in
various operational settings.141 If our objection was purely instrumental,
we would have to concede that there would be nothing wrong with such
militarized police forces. Yet, there still remains something disturbing in
the vision of good-mannered, disciplined, and approachable police rolling
in tanks through our neighborhoods. This is the predicament of instru-
mentalist arguments: they are virtually always contingent.
There seems, then, to be something else, not-strictly-instrumental,
that underlies the genuine objection to police militarization.142 This is
why we need a principled, non-consequentialist argument to advance the
discussion.
tally”); for a possible correlation between militarization and police violence see Delehanty et al.,
supra note 117.
139. See, e.g., Timothy J. Dunn, Border Militarization via Drug and Immigration Enforcement:
Human Rights Implications, 28 SOC. JUST. 7 (2001).
140. See BALKO, supra note 40, passim.
141. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY & U.S. MARINE CORPS, supra note 134.
142. Alon Harel identifies this need as stemming from the “insincerity or inauthenticity” of
the traditional structure of instrumental arguments in political/legal contexts. ALON HAREL,
WHY LAW MATTERS 4 (2014).
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IV. THE PRINCIPLED CASE AGAINST POLICE MILITARIZATION
In this Part, we propose a principled objection to police militariza-
tion. First, militarization entails a presumption that the policed community
and individuals are threatening. A liberal order, conversely, must be based
on precisely the opposite presumption: that of non-threat. Indeed, the
prevalence of the presumption of non-threat is a key difference between
liberal states and totalitarian ones.
Second, the presumption of threat, manifested in militarization, trig-
gers the exclusion of the policed community, through the symbolic power
of police. Importantly, this exclusion emanates from the cultural perception
of militarization rather than from a particular instance of use of force by
militarized police.
Third, when this distinction is created by militarized police—rather
than by locally deployed military forces during emergencies—the potential
for exclusion is more significant due to the normalizing effect of police.
A. Militarization as a Presumption of Threat
Imagine that you participate in a political demonstration in your city.
The police—entrusted with preserving order—appear militarized: an
armed personnel carrier is deployed and personnel wear armor, helmets,
and carry assault rifles. The message must be that the state views you, and
other participants, as posing a level of threat of the type that can only be
properly countered by deploying, in advance, forces capable of using ex-
treme violence. Militarization thus entails a presumption that the policed
community poses a certain level of threat, so intense that it requires the
availability of combat-ready forces.143 We refer to this state of mind and its
effects as the presumption of threat.144
The presumption of threat is a product of two interrelated character-
istics of militarization. First, when militarization becomes normalized, it
also becomes collective, in the sense that its reference point is not specifi-
cally threatening individuals in specific circumstances, but rather an un-
specified group of people—the policed community.145 Second,
143. Cf. Neta Ziv, Excessive Use of Force as a Means of Social Exclusion: The Forced Eviction of
Squatters in Israel, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 167, 175 (2006).
144. Ramsay argues, relatedly, that the “right to security” is increasingly understood,
through the proliferation of preventive and collective legislation, as amounting to an obligation
“to reassure others of your good intentions.” Normal relations between human beings are thus
presumed to be exceptional, while a possible threat becomes normal. RAMSAY, supra note 6, at
214 –15. To an extent, the notion of the presumption of threat correlates with the idea of “risk
societies.” See Nicholas S. Bolduc, Global Insecurity: How Risk Theory Gave Rise to Police Militari-
zation, 23 IND. J. GLOB. LEG. ST. 267, 269 –271 (2016).
145. We use the term “policed community” here rather loosely. A policed community
here is a group constituted as such by virtue of the mere fact that it is perceived as requiring the
deployment of militarized forces. In other words, the deployment of militarized forces in a spe-
cific instance constitutes a policed community for our purposes, defined precisely by its subjec-
tion to such forces.
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militarization is preventive, in the sense that it is not based upon an actual,
imminent and grave threat, but rather on the assumption that such threat is
present, whether emanating from society at large or (perhaps more often)
from certain groups within society, or from certain individuals inter alia
because of their belonging to specific groups.
To clarify how militarization implies a presumption of threat, it is
helpful to draw from the distinction made in international law between
law enforcement operations undertaken in peacetime and hostilities con-
ducted during armed conflicts.146 In absence of an armed conflict, law
enforcement operations are conducted under the presumption that unless
circumstances absolutely prove otherwise, individuals do not pose a threat
of the scope and level that must be confronted with severe, possibly lethal
violence. This view is behind the use-of-force continuums required by
international law in law enforcement operations,147 and also in the practice
of many police departments.148 The upshot is of course that threat must be
individually determined and must be imminent.
Traditional military operations, conversely, operate under the exact
opposite presumption: certain categories of individuals are a priori threats,
and therefore can be collectively neutralized—including by premeditated,
proactive use of lethal force.149 The hostilities paradigm is thus collective,
since a person becomes targetable on account of formal status. It is also
preventive in the sense that status implies threat, even if the individual
combatant was not threatening, in the strict sense, at the time of attack.150
In short, armed conflict entails the reversal of the presumption of non-
threat precisely on these two levels.  Due to this reversal, international law
is clear that the switch between the law enforcement paradigm and that of
hostilities requires (at least) the factual existence of organized armed vio-
lence.151 These understandings of military operations are not only abstract
legal concepts but reflect deeply entrenched societal conventions on the
nature of war.152
146. See, e.g., Eliav Lieblich, Quasi-Hostile Acts: The Limits on Forcible Disruption Operations
under International Law, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 101, 110–16 (2014).
147. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, art.
9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (Sept. 7, 1990).
148. See Joel H. Garner & Christopher D. Maxwell, Measuring the Amount of Force Used By
and Against the Police in Six Jurisdictions, USE OF FORCE BY POLICE: OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL
AND LOCAL DATA 25, 37-38, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/176330-2.pdf.
149. See, e.g., GORIA GAGGIOLI, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, EXPERT MEETING: THE USE
OF FORCE IN ARMED CONFLICTS: INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT PARADIGMS 8-9 (2013).
150. See, e.g., DAVID RODIN, WAR & SELF DEFENSE 127 (2002); but see Ryan Goodman,
The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 819 (2013); Gabriella Blum,
The Dispensible Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 115 (2010).
151. Cf. Eliav Lieblich, Internal Jus ad Bellum, 67 HAST. L. J. 687, 729 –740 (2016).
152. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HIS-
TORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 44 (1977).
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An example of how militarization can reflect a presumption of threat
can be found in the infamous use by the LAPD, during the 1980s “war on
drugs,” of battering rams attached to armored vehicles for the purpose of
rapidly tearing down doors and walls and forcibly breaking into suspected
drug houses.153 This tactic exhibited both elements of militarization: a
complete use-of-force continuum is not envisioned due to a predetermi-
nation of severe threat;154 and the threat is attached to categories of persons
rather than individuals—in this example, residents in neighborhoods
predominantly inhabited by minorities, albeit suspected of drug of-
fenses.155 Indeed, the choice of theaters in which such units are deployed
implies that, like in military operations, levels of threat are at least partially
determined in relation to categories of individuals or their geographical
location. In other words, militarization of police—just like “proper” mili-
tary operations—inherently assumes a heightened level of threat, usually
from a group of people, at a certain place, rather than from individuals. It
thus transforms law enforcement activity from an individual-based action
to one which assumes some collective threat.
This reversal seems to permeate the discourse of militarized police
personnel. Consider, for instance, SWAT units. Recall that, initially,
LAPD chief Daryl Gates envisioned SWAT as “Special Weapons Attack
Teams.”156 As aforementioned, the word “attack,” which connotes proac-
tive acts of violence against an enemy157 was replaced by “tactics” in order
to better place SWAT units within the ethos of policing.158 Police chiefs
have also reported that outfitting police in battle uniforms creates a mind-
set that “you’re a soldier at war.”159 In a sense, the presumption of threat is
a necessary byproduct of military training of police.160
153. See Donna Murch, Crack in Los Angeles: Crisis, Militarization, and Black Responses to the
Late Twentieth-Century War on Drugs, 102 J. AM. HIST. 162 (2015).
154. See Philip Hager, ACLU Asks Court to Bar LAPD’s Battering Ram, L.A. TIMES (May
13, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-05-13/local/me-5949_1_drug-dealers.
155. Murch, supra note 153, at 164 (noting that militarization predominantly affected Afri-
can American and Latino neighborhoods in South Central Los Angeles).
156. See text accompanying note 43.
157. See, e.g., the international legal definition of “attack” as comprising “acts of violence
against the adversary.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relation to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977,
art. 49, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
158. GATES & SHAH, supra note 45, at 131 (1993) (cited in BALKO, supra note 40, at 62).
159. Id. at 191.
160. See Campbell & Campbell, supra note 134, at 5 (noting that military training is ori-
ented toward the “elimination of an enemy threat”).  Likewise, Army Lt. General Thomas Kel-
ley, Director of Operations for the Joints Chiefs of Staff, said to the House Committee on the
Armed Services: “When you deal with police officers, they think in terms of going to court and
we don’t. We’re sort of like a special operations soldier who is taught to clear a room by killing
the bad guys and not touching the hostages. . .” (cited in Dunn, supra note 139, at 9-10).
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However, a possible counterargument is that during hostilities, mili-
taries actually target individuals in line with the presumption of threat.
Conversely, militarized police, although adopting certain military attrib-
utes, do not. Thus, it could be argued that since police in practice still
operate within the traditional law enforcement notions of individual threat
and strictly reactive lethal force, they do not really operate under a pre-
sumption of threat. Our claim, however, is more nuanced. To us, the mere
deployment of combat-ready police conveys to the community that it must
be threatening; otherwise such forces would have not been needed to be-
gin with. Thus, the point of assessment of the action is already in time of
deployment, which must be understood as collective preventative action.
Indeed, as we detail later, once this possibility of combat is performed and
asserted, the presumption of threat is already established.
A presumption of threat is a factual mode of operation. However, as
we argue, a foundational principle of the liberal order must require just the
opposite: that the State does not act upon the presumption that its citizens
are threatening.
B. The Presumption of Non-Threat as a Principle of the Liberal Order
The liberal legitimization of the State is traditionally grounded on its
fundamentality for the achievement of the triumvirate of “life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness.”161 Other, more progressive versions, advance
justice, fairness, and welfare based justifications.162 Common to all these
visions is that the individual must be the end of all political action163 and
that freedom can only be restricted when its use harms others.164 As we
have shown, instrumental arguments against police militarization claim
that it adversely affects these basic rights and principles.
Yet we believe that a meaningful liberal order must be based on an-
other foundational principle, one that captures the salient, principled
problem of militarized police. To an extent, this foundational principle is
derived from the Hobbesian notion of security as a basic end of the com-
monwealth.165 However, it differs from the basic Hobbesian idea since it
does not focus on the individual as a potential victim in the absence of
security.166 Nor does our account afford absolute primacy to the concept
161. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
162. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999 ed.).
163. See, e.g., DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN art. 2 (France, 1789).
164. Id. art. 4; JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 23 (2nd ed., 1863).
165. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 117 (Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (1651); see generally
Liora Lazarus, The Right to Security, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 423
(Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2015).
166. Id. at 423.
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of security, as Hobbes suggested.167 Rather, we focus on the exclusionary
effect that materializes when the state perceives the individual as a potential
threat. As we argue, the liberal order cannot presume that citizens pose a
threat absent a clear, individually determined factual basis, without unrav-
eling. Therefore, the liberal order cannot be preserved unless operating
under a presumption of non-threat.
The upshot of the presumption of non-threat is that threat must al-
ways be determined individually, and accordingly that violent or coercive
action can be only reactive or preemptive. When threat is presumed, state
action becomes collective and preventative.168 A presumption of threat is
behind policies such as mass preventative internment;169 counter-terrorism
policies that hinge on group belonging;170 “early warning” systems;171 ra-
cial profiling;172 barriers to citizenship based on ethnic grounds for osten-
sible “security” reasons;173 or mass surveillance, in itself a concept centered
on preventative law enforcement.174 More generally, the institution of a
presumption of threat is a key element of an exception becoming
normalized.
Conversely, the presumption of non-threat complements, and is en-
tangled with, traditional justifications for liberal rights. For instance, the
presumption of innocence, as well as due process rights in general, are
usually justified as necessary for the protection of freedom and auton-
167. Id. at 425 (noting that it is possible to agree with Hobbes’s view of the centrality of
the need for security without adopting his view on the primacy of security and unlimited sover-
eign power).
168. Cf. RAMSAY, supra note 6, at 213, 230.
169. Perhaps it is unsurprising then that the infamous preventive mass internment of Japa-
nese Americans during World War II was based on military orders. See Nanette Dembitz, Racial
Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court’s Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 175, 175 –177 (1945).
170. See Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1413, 1417 (2002).
171. Michael Price, New Counterterrorism Program in Los Angeles: Suspicious Thought Report-
ing, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/35054/counterterrorism-
program-los-angeles-suspicious-thought-reporting/.
172. See Gross & Livingston, supra note 170, at 1415. An example for preventative and
collective reasoning can be found in a 2016 statement from GOP Presidential Candidate Ted
Cruz, that “[w]e need to empower law enforcement to patrol and secure Muslim neighbor-
hoods [collectiveness] before they become radicalized [preventative].” Jeremy Diamond, Ted
Cruz: Police Need to ‘Patrol and Secure’ Muslim Neighborhoods, C.N.N.  (Mar. 23, 2016), http://
edition.cnn.com/2016/03/22/politics/ted-cruz-muslim-neighborhoods/index.html.
173. See, e.g., H.C.J. 466/07 Gal-On v. Attorney General [2012] (ISR), http://versa.
cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/gal-v-attorney-general-summary.
174. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV.  1,
4 (2008); see also Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1933 (2013).
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omy.175 However, they can just as well be understood as protecting a free-
dom from being considered a threat to the State and others.
Essentially, one key difference between liberal and totalitarian states is
that in the former citizens are presumed non-threatening, while in the
latter, the entire State apparatus is structured in anticipation of internal
threats.176 Indeed, even the hardnosed realist Carl Schmitt conceded that
“[n]o democracy exists without the presupposition that the people are
good” and thus their will is valid,177 while absolutism invokes the axiom
that humans are naturally evil, and therefore strong authority is justified.178
In terms of political theory, the threat/non-threat dialectic can be traced
to the differing perceptions in classic thought of human beings in pre-State
society (the “state of nature”). In this context, social contractarians fre-
quently point out that anarchy breeds a security dilemma.179 While theo-
rists differ on the morality of violence under anarchy, most agree that an
organized political community—a commonwealth—is a solution to inse-
curity under the state of nature.180  Yet, these theories largely follow two
archetypal models—for our purposes, the Hobbesian and Lockean—
which differ precisely on the scope of power in the hands of the sovereign,
and consequently, on the extent to which the sovereign can assume the
citizen/subject is threatening. Simply put, while the Hobbesian (absolutist)
model leads to a sovereign that can act in accordance with a presumption
of threat, the (liberal) Lockean model does not.181
To Hobbes, the state of nature is an unavoidable condition of war
because of the natural inclinations of individuals, their possession of “the
right to everything,” and their equal powers to harm one another.182
Under such conditions, individuals are always mutually threatening, and
175. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L. J.
724, 727 –37 (2011).
176. See for instance Arendt’s famous description of the Soviet elaborate system of com-
partmentalized cross-spying. HANNA ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM  403
(1951). For similar reasons, in totalitarian states, the most elite fighting units report directly to the
dictator and are chiefly meant to protect the stability of the regime against internal threats, for
instance from the army. See, e.g., Iraq’s Republican Guard, THE IRAQ WAR ENCYCLOPEDIA at
343 (Thomas R. Mockaitis ed., 2013).
177. SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 28, at 24.
178. CARL SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP 6 (Michael Hoelzl & Graham Ward trans, 2014)
(1921).
179. For a basic explanation of the security dilemma, albeit in international anarchy, see
Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD POL. 167, 167 –170 (1978); in
domestic settings, see Barry R. Posen, The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, 35 GLOB. POL. &
STRATEGY 27 (1993).
180. Lazarus, supra note 165, at 424-29.
181. This is not to say that Hobbes was not a liberal, since his thought is indeed individual-
ist. However, the nature of the commonwealth that Hobbes envisioned – the result of his analysis
– cannot be reconciled with the liberal state. We thank Alon Harel for this point.
182. HOBBES, supra note 165, at 86-87.
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therefore preventative action is always necessary and justified.183 In other
words, Hobbes’s state of nature is defined precisely in that individuals are presumed
to be mutually threatening. It is this condition that drives individuals to enter
into a reciprocal agreement with others for mutual security.184 War is ter-
minated when persons, through this agreement, divest themselves from the
right of all things—including the right to act preventatively—and leave
that power only to the sovereign.185 In essence, therefore, individuals abdi-
cate their right to presume that others are threatening while retaining the
right to act in self-defense only when actually assaulted.186
Hobbes’s idea of the commonwealth famously envisioned an abso-
lute sovereign that imposes peace through fear.187 A Hobbesian sovereign
could indeed presume that its subjects are threatening by nature. A “visible
power to keep them [the subjects] in awe,” Hobbes writes, is needed to
keep their natural passions at bay.188  Of course, such a sovereign could
deploy militarized forces to instill fear, to counter this presumed threat. It
is exactly on this point that Hobbesian social-contractarianism differs from
the ideas undergirding (ideal) liberal-democratic states. While we might
agree (or not) that in a hypothetical state of nature individuals can presume
that others threaten them, we can hardly retain a liberal view of the State if
we argue that such powers remain in the hand of the sovereign. Even
under the Hobbesian view of the state of nature, the establishment of po-
litical society must at least entail a shift in the perception of individuals
from threatening to non-threatening. Otherwise, the State simply recreates
the state of nature it is meant to avert.189
Locke shared with Hobbes the position that the purpose of the State
is security.190 In his state of nature, too, persons enjoy “perfect freedom”
and equality.191 However, contrary to Hobbes, equality does not provide
for preventive violence but precisely the opposite: a prohibition on harm-
ing one another, unless in imminent self-defense or as punishment.192 For
Locke, a state of nature is not necessarily a state of war, but rather a condi-
183. Id. Ch. 13, 134-39; see also RAMSAY, supra note 6, at 1.
184. HOBBES, supra note 165, Chs. 14, 17.
185. Id. at 92, 120, 214. Indeed, Hobbes expressly argued that the sovereign is authorized
to act “beforehand” to prevent discord and to maintain peace. Id. at 124.
186. Id. at 93.
187. Id. at 120.
188. Id. at 117.
189. Locke criticized the Hobbesian position precisely on this point. JOHN LOCKE, SEC-
OND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 47 (Mark Goldie
ed., 2016) (1690); See RAMSAY, supra note 6, at 3-4.
190. Lazarus, supra note 165, at 425.
191. LOCKE, supra note 189, at 4.
192. Id. at 4-6, 64.
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tion in which war is both more likely and potentially more destructive. It
is this that leads individuals to form a political society.193
Thus, for Locke, even in the state of nature individuals cannot act on
the basis that others are threatening. Since the Lockean sovereign derives
its power from the transfer of “executive power” from individuals to the
public,194 this a priori means that it cannot assume a presumption of threat
that is unavailable to individuals in the state of nature.195 Put differently,
individuals cannot give to the State something they themselves do not pos-
sess. It follows that when acting under a presumption of threat, we are
precisely following the absolutist Hobbesian logic concerning the powers
of government.
Indeed, the notion of security is central both to Hobbes’s absolutist
view and to Locke’s balanced approach, in which security is but one value
within the ends of “peace, safety, and public good of the people.”196
While it is beyond this Article to develop a theory of a liberal right to
security—a contested issue in political theory197—it is sufficient, for our
purposes, to argue that any proper understanding of “security” cannot be
convincingly reconciled with the presumption of threat. In a sense, a nor-
malized presumption of threat is tantamount to a normalized state of
emergency, in which the Hobbesian logic of the state of nature as constant
threat prevails. An individual thus cannot enjoy security when she is pre-
sumed to be a threat, since being perceived as such implies exclusion from
the same order ostensibly charged with maintaining security and protect-
ing her: it implies that she is in a Hobbesian state of nature in relation to
the State, even as she is situated within the State.198
Until now we only implied a connection between the presumption
of threat and the notion of exclusion. In the next Section, we expand on
193. Id. at 12-13, 63–64.
194. Id. at 45, 65.
195. As Locke contends, the sovereign cannot be “arbitrary over the lives and the fortunes
of the peoples. . . for nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself,” and
individuals do not possess such arbitrary powers Id. at 67.
196. LOCKE, supra note 189, at 65; for a comparison between Hobbesean and Lockean
notions of security, see Lazarus, supra note 165.
197. As Lazarus notes, current literature on the right to security identifies narrow and wide
approaches. Narrow approaches consider security as consisting namely as freedom from physical
harm See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
20 (2nd ed., 1996).  Wider approaches view the concept of security as including “enabling”
capabilities. See Sandra Feldman, The Positive Right to Security, in SECURITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 307 (BJ Goold & L. Lazarus eds., 2007). For these sources and others, see Lazarus, supra
note 165, at 429-34. Some note (and criticize) that the understanding of security has evolved to
encompass subjective elements. See RAMSAY, supra note 6, Ch. 10.
198. Agamben formulated the relation between state of exception, the state of nature and
the notion of exclusion: “The state of nature and the state of exception are nothing but two
sides . . . in which what was presupposed as external (the state of nature) now reappears . . . in
the inside (as state of exception).” AGAMBEN, supra note 6, at 37.
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the concept of militarization and exclusion by demonstrating that milita-
rized police possess the symbolic power to mark the policed community as
the enemy, to exclude it from the political collective, and to ultimately
normalize this exclusion.
C. The Symbolic Power of Police, Exclusion, and the
Normalization of the Exclusion
1. The Symbolic and Exclusionary Power of Militarization
Both police and military are organs of State coercion. Functionally,
one can argue that they are interchangeable if necessity dictates.199 If we
adopt a simplistic perception of State power as violence, the police, in
descriptive terms, are simply an agency that applies coercive force for the
purpose of imposing a legally justified end within a given society. In
Weberian terms, it is merely one arm through which the State’s monopoly
on force is carried out.200 All other conditions being equal, if the police do
not bear an additional—even symbolic—meaning, it shouldn’t matter
whether coercion is conducted by police or military forces, and conse-
quently, by traditional or militarized police forces.
However, when looking at the constitutional practice of States, it is
clear that deploying military forces within State boundaries packs explosive
political meaning. For instance, it was famously cited in the U.S. Declara-
tion of Independence as part of the “long train of abuses and usurpations”
that justified secession of from Great Britain.201 Similarly, in modern con-
stitutional law of many nations, the role of armed forces is generally re-
stricted to the defense of the State, while their internal deployment is
permitted only during emergencies or when special national security con-
cerns require so.202 While these restrictions could be partly explained by
the historically abusive tendencies of standing armies (and specifically the
practice of quartering),203 the objection to standing armies is, at bottom, a
199. Indeed, occupying armed forces frequently engage in policing and law enforcement.
See generally Kenneth Watkin, Use of Force During Occupation: Law Enforcement and Conduct of
Hostilities, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 267 (2012).
200. Max Weber, Politics as Vocation, in MAX WEBER: THE VOCATION LECTURES 32
(Rodney Livingstone et al. eds., 2004) (1919); see Jan Terpstra, Two Theories on the Police – The
Relevance of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim to the Study of the Police, 39 INT’L J. L, CRIME & JUST.
1, 4 (2011); compare Ziv, supra note 143, at 172-73.
201. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
202. See, e.g., German Constitution Art. 87a; U.S. Constitution Art. 8(15).
203. Indeed, this problem prompted the enactment of the Third Amendment. William S.
Fields & David T. Hardy, The Third Amendment and the Issue of the Maintenance of Standing Armies:
A Legal History, 35 AM. J. LEG. HIST 393-95 (1991) (arguing that the grievance which the
amendment sought to address was the abuses of persons and property resulting from quartering
of British soldiers).
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principled one, relating to their military character rather than their actual
abuses.204
Indeed, the distinction between different forms of State coercion is as
old as the State itself. For instance, although the most important precursor
to the modern administrative state—the Roman Republic and then Em-
pire—did not possess a specialized police force,205 there was some distinc-
tion between the military and other agents of coercion. Roman
magistrates were always accompanied by lictors carrying fasces, but ax-
blades would be fixed only when leaving city limits.206 Since magistrates
held dual civil and military roles, the presence of lictors—rather than
soldiers—symbolized their civilian function. For this reason, when Mark
Antony was accompanied by soldiers rather by lictors, he was condemned
for acting as a tyrant.207
Why, then, do societies generally distinguish between different
agents of coercion? The answer is all about drawing boundaries. In ancient
Rome, a fundamental constitutional principle distinguished between the
city as a “pacified sphere” (pomerium), surrounded by a “sacred boundary,”
from which military power was excluded.208 As discussed above, this idea
can also be found in liberal social contractarian thought, in which the State
represents a realm of peace, distinguished from the state of nature—and
possibly war—lurking outside.209
Militaries are thus perceived as forces of external coercion, suppos-
edly operating in the anarchic state of nature, and acting under a presump-
tion of threat emanating from the enemy. They are meant to protect the
social contract from outside threats, where the state of nature supposedly
reigns. Police, on the other hand, are an agent of the internal social con-
tract. Phrased in this manner, we can already understand the exclusionary
power of militaries or militarized forces. Police are perceived as a coercive
power acting within the community, within and part of the social con-
204. Id. at 395, 415-20 (connecting the specific problem of quartering to the larger politi-
cal issue of keeping standing armies in peacetime).
205. WILFRIED NIPPEL, PUBLIC ORDER IN ANCIENT ROME 2 (1995).
206. Id. at 13.
207. Id. at 15.
208. Id. at 4.
209. To Hobbes, once a State is formed, a stark division is established between the state of
peace within the commonwealth, and the state of nature – and thus war – between the com-
monwealth and external elements. HOBBES, supra note 165, at 138-39. While Locke did not
necessarily view the relations between the community and those outside as a state of war, he too
saw the State as a tool to provide “a greater security against any that are not of it.” LOCKE, supra
note 189, at 49. This notion is by no means a Western construction. A parallel concept appears
in traditional Islamic thought, which distinguishes between Muslim territory (Dar al-Islam) and
“territories of war” (Dar al-Harb) beyond the borders. See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 62
(John L. Esposito ed., 2003).
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tract; militaries act against those outside.210 Police act as trustees, militaries
act as adversaries.211 When the military or militarized police are deployed
internally, they exclude the targeted communities from the body politic.
In our view, then, the root of the police/military distinction cannot
be captured only by referring to the historical problem of standing armies,
or by functional or instrumental grounds such as the fear of excessive
force.212 Rather, the root lies in the symbolism of the perception of “po-
lice” and “military” in a given society; and specifically, in their respective
perceptions as inclusionary versus exclusionary forces.
To understand how militarization excludes we must first understand
the power of symbols. Symbols are spoken or visual forms that convey a
collective meaning, whether directly or implicitly.213 They can serve as
powerful political signifiers, possessing the capacity to “preserve or to
transform objective principles of union and separation. . .of association and
dissociation.”214 Those who possess symbolic power—for instance, those
who act upon state authority—215 have the “power to make groups” and
to make “visible and explicit social divisions.”216 In the context of police,
theorists describe its “symbolic power” as a source of “powerful, effica-
cious collective representations about community, order, the distinction
between good and evil, and about security and protection.”217 Those who
are served by the police are thus part of a de facto community.
However, when symbols build on representations that tap into cul-
tural associations that inspire (and normalize) fear and subservience—even
without exercising direct violence—symbolic power turns into symbolic
violence.218 This is precisely the transformation that occurs when police
are militarized. A militarized police force—qua police—retains its sym-
bolic power to “make groups” and to make collective representations
about community. This power turns exclusionary as the symbolism be-
comes increasingly violent. As we demonstrate below, the potential for an
especially intense type of violence—that amounting to the possibility of
combat—is a strong signifier of exclusion.
210. Cf. Paul Sieghart, Harmless Weapons – a Threat to Liberty?, 77 NEW SCIENTIST 841,
841 (1978).
211. For a concise recent summary of the perception of public power as representing fidu-
ciary relations see Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125
YALE L. J. 1820, 1825-28 (2016).
212. See supra Sec. II.A.
213. John Paul & Michael L. Birzer, Images of Power: An Analysis of the Militarization of Police
Uniforms and Messages of Service, 32 FREE INQ. IN CREATIVE. SOC. 121, 121(2004).
214. Pierre Bourdieu, Social Space and Symbolic Power, 7 SOC. THEORY 14, 23 (1989).
215. Id. at 24.
216. Id. at 23.
217. Terpstra, supra note 200, at 7.
218. Paul & Birzer, supra note 47, at 25.
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The power of symbols has not been overlooked by legal scholars.
Expressive theorists219 of law argue, much in line with the idea of symbolic
power, that “[t]he expressive dimension of governmental action plays a
central role. . .in constitutional law,”220 and that governments cannot act
in ways that convey that certain “social impressions” override all compet-
ing values, since these cause expressive harms.221 For instance, in their
work on voting rights and district redistribution, Pildes and Niemi argued
that redistribution (gerrymandering) can be unconstitutional even without
causing material harm (such as by vote dilution), precisely because it con-
veys the social impression that “race consciousness” is an overriding con-
sideration.222 Militarization and the presumption of threat that underlies it
pack symbolic power that can generate the expressive harm of exclusion.
When this process is pervasive, as is the case with normalized milita-
rization, it can solidify and reify this exclusion in the public eye. Indeed,
some scholars argue that the expressive power of law (in the broad sense) is
reflected, inter alia, in its ability to convey information.223 Law in general,
police action included, signals attitudes and information that affect behav-
ior and public beliefs.224 Arguably, the practice of police militarization—
especially in an era in which media coverage is ubiquitous—225 can affect
the general perception of the policed community as particularly threaten-
ing.226 As images of militarized police marching in the streets of Ferguson
were transmitted into every screen, a particular image of the local residents
was also transmitted.
As discussed above, the deployment of militarized police in a given
arena is laden with exclusionary potential. However, does this remain true
even if these forces do not actually engage in combat, but are only present
in this or that community? In the next Section, we turn to explore the
notion that the mere deployment of militarized forces indicates the possibil-
ity of combat, and that this in itself results in exclusion from the political
community.
219. For a helpful (critical) survey of expressive theories, see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive
Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000).
220. Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEG. STUD. 725, 760 (1998).
221. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483,
526-38 (1993).
222. Id. at 526-27.
223. RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS
5-7 (2015).
224. Id. at 136-37, 170-75.
225. Id. at 183.
226. See Ziv, supra note 143, at 178-79.
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2. Deployment of Militarized Forces as a Friend/Enemy Distinction
To better understand the exclusion generated by the symbolic power
of militarization, a helpful point of departure is Carl Schmitt’s famous
view of “the political”—and the concept of the State itself—as based on
the friend/enemy distinction.227 Particularly relevant is the central mean-
ing Schmitt attributes to the act of distinction, marked by the performance
of the possibility of combat.
To Schmitt, a people’s collective political existence hinges on a dis-
tinction between friend and enemy.228 Now, not every disagreement re-
sults in such a distinction, but only one which exhibits “the utmost degree
of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation.”229
Meaning, the distinction results in the inclusion in or exclusion of the
enemy—the perennial “other”—from the political collective.230
Importantly, the degree of intensity, which implies political dissocia-
tion, is achieved only when the possibility of violent conflict is recog-
nized.231 To Schmitt, “[a]n enemy exists only when, at least potentially,
one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity.”232 The
enemy concept thus hinges on “the ever present possibility of combat.”233
Combat here is not a metaphor: rather, the potential of real war and killing
must exist. Otherwise, at hand is only a local, non-excluding, dispute
within members of the community. Now, it is important to stress that for a
friend/enemy distinction to be made, combat does not have to actually
take place, but must be present as a possibility.234 The political, in sum, is
the “mode of behavior” which follows the possibility of combat.235
How does this reflect on police militarization? As the possibility of
physical killing must be present for a political distinction, the concept of
the weapon—and more so, the type of weapon culturally perceived as fit
227. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 19 (1932).
228. Id. at 26.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 27. Agamben sees the inclusion/exclusion as the “fundamental categorical pair”
of politics, the friend/enemy distinction being merely an instrument to establish it. AGAMBEN,
supra note 6, at 8.
231. SCHMITT, supra note 227, at 27.
232. Id. at 28. Note that the focus on collectivity corresponds with our earlier description
of the presumption of threat and militarization as connoting a collective element.
233. Id. at 32.
234. Id. at 34-35. To Harel, the subjection to arbitrary decision places one “at the mercy”
of another, which is in itself a deprivation of freedom. HAREL, supra note 142, at 174. Agamben
too noted the “potentiality” of action as a defining characteristic of sovereignty. AGAMBEN, supra
note 6, at 46.
235. SCHMITT, supra note 227, at 37. We certainly do not have to accept Schmitt’s norma-
tive conclusions to appreciate the exclusionary power of the friend/enemy distinction he
describes.
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for combat—is central.236 The appearance of such weapons may be the
ultimate signifier of a friend/enemy distinction, and correspondingly, of
the exclusion of the subject from the political collective. The same can be
said concerning military-style battle dress fatigues or combat helmets, as
representations with clear cultural connotations: these can effectively sym-
bolize the declaration of a “domestic enemy.”237
In sum, when the police, whether due to their weapons, equipment,
or uniform, take the form of a militarized force—meaning, that through
their cultural representations they are perceived as equipped for the possi-
bility of combat—essentially a new friend/enemy distinction emerges,
whereby the policed community is excluded from the political collective.
The fact that these weapons are not always used, but rather are displayed,
does not alter this effect, since it is the possibility of combat, coupled with
the power to decide that lethal force should be used,238 that generates the
exclusionary power of militarized police.239
We are now in a better position to understand the complaint by Fer-
guson demonstrators of being under “occupation.”240 This labeling, in
fact, captures a remarkably precise distinction, reflecting exactly the exclu-
sionary power of militarization. While a State might conceivably impose
martial law within its territory in extraordinary circumstances and subject
to constitutional mechanisms,241 it by definition cannot “occupy” its own
sovereign territory. Occupation, as commonly understood, is a factual sit-
uation in which a State gains control over external, hostile territory, terri-
tory over which the it has no sovereign title and is not indebted politically
to the local population.242 Importantly, occupation implies both spatial
and personal exclusion. When protesters complain of “occupation,” they
are noting the effect of being marked as an enemy and thus placed in a
236. Id. at 32-33.
237. See id. at 46-47. As former Seattle Police Chief Stamper noted, “Everyday policing is
characterized by a SWAT mentality, every other 911 call a military mission. What emerges is a
picture of a vital public-safety institution perpetually at war with its own people.” Stamper, supra
note 16.
238. SCHMITT, supra note 227, at 35 (“What always matters is the possibility of the ex-
treme case taking place, the real war, and the decision whether this situation has or has not
arrived”).
239. This distinguishes our position from Neta Ziv’s. Ziv elegantly shows that any use of
massive police force transforms political activists to “criminals,” and thereby causes social exclu-
sion. See Ziv, supra note 143, at 190-94. Our argument is that militarization takes this a step
further: not only criminalization, but construction as enemies which is the most intense type of
exclusion.
240. See Chasmar, supra note 1.
241. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE AND GRAY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL WAR 40-44 (2010).
242. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land its Annex: Reg-
ulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 1 Bevans 631; BENVENISTI, supra note 3, at 43, 68-106.
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zone of exclusion within their own State, where “outside and inside” be-
come intermingled.243
This effect is all the more significant when the policed community is
comprised primarily of minorities. Indeed, the exclusionary result of the
friend/enemy distinction is amplified when aimed at historically marginal-
ized communities, as it could reify already prevailing notions of exclusion
and alienation.244 Experience shows that militarized police forces have
been deployed more in African American and other minority communi-
ties.245 As suggested in the literature, one reason for this is precisely a col-
lective presumption of threat.246 This realization highlights a further
troubling aspect of police militarization: its potential not only to exclude,
but also to normalize the exclusion in a way that disparately impacts those
that are already wielders of inferior social power.
3. Militarized Police and the Normalization of the Exclusion
Above, we claimed that police possess the symbolic power to ex-
clude, when it bears the cultural hallmarks of militarization. It is arguable,
however, that as long as State coercion is conducted by forces formally be-
longing to the police, the symbolic distinction between police and military
remains. If this were true, the mere fact that militarized police maintain
their formal definition as “police” and retain some symbolic distinction,
such as badges or insignia, would alleviate our concerns. If you will, the
inclusionary power of police would “cancel out,” the exclusionary power
of combat-ready appearances. Perhaps for this reason the U.S. Posse Com-
itatus Act prohibits the “use” of “any part of the Army or Air Force” for
policing, but the Secretary of Defense may authorize the use of military
equipment by the police.247 However, the usual procedure is that military
markings are removed or covered in such cases.248
Here, however, we must point out a key paradox: the same inclusio-
nary symbolic power of police also breeds its especially harmful potential.
Since police are an organ of the “normal” legal order, constantly present
243. AGAMBEN, supra note 6, at 37. The flipside is that when establishing such a zone of
exclusion, the state effectively admits that its own sovereign authority in the area is questionable.
We thank Peter Ramsay for pointing this out.
244. Ta-Nehisi Coates argues that the distinction between authority (relations of consent/
inclusion) and power (relations of force/exclusion) can be applied to the relations between police
and African American communities, which he views as under the power of police rather than
their authority. The distinction between authority and power is remarkably similar to the dis-
tinction between sovereignty and occupation. See Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Myth of Police Reform,
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-
myth-of-police-reform/390057/.
245. See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 16, at 5.
246. See Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police
Violence?, 51 HARV. CR-CL L REV. 159, 179-80 (2016).
247. 18 U.S.C. §1385; 10 U.S.C. §372.
248. Kopel & Blackman, supra note 67, at 623.
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and unrestricted to extreme emergencies, its transformation can lead to a
normalization of a certain type of distinction.249 In other words, since po-
lice symbolizes inclusion within a political system, it can be a vehicle
through which exclusion can become internalized as part of the norm, as
part of the system.250 When it is the police—in contrast, say, to armed
forces deployed in “true” extreme emergencies such as civil wars—that
carries out the friend/enemy distinction, the message is all the more pow-
erful: the enemy status becomes part of the regular political life of the
community.
Critical thinkers have long noted the potential of the police as a nor-
malizer of state violence. Hannah Arendt, for instance, pointed out that
totalitarian regimes tend to disproportionately strengthen the police, since
it is more efficient as a force of oppression than the military. To Arendt,
the protective military ethos results in that “even under totalitarian condi-
tions they [members of the military] find it difficult to regard their own
people with the eyes of a foreign occupier.”251 Indeed, this rings true, at
least in States where the military is by and large representative of a rela-
tively homogenous society.252 Already in the nineteenth century, Britons
complained, at times of social unrest, that the military forces they encoun-
tered “know how to behave themselves, but the police don’t.”253 More
recently, during the 2011 revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, the military
refused to act against demonstrators, as opposed to the police and internal
security apparatuses.254
Walter Benjamin, too, pointed out this nature of police violence,
manifested precisely in its norm-setting potential. Benjamin characterized
all “legal” (contra “pure”) violence as serving either a lawmaking or law
preserving function.255 To Benjamin, the military serves a “lawmaking”
function vis-a`-vis a vanquished enemy,256 while serving a “law preserving”
249. See Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 11, at 1.
250. Giorgio Agamben’s famous concept of homo sacer is helpful here, as it conceptualizes
the paradox of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion in the legal order. See AGAMBEN, supra note
6, at 8-12, 17-18.
251. ARENDT, supra note 176, at 420.
252. The conclusion might be different in heterogeneous societies. For instance, the Syrian
Army is dominated by Alawites, loyal to President Assad, arguably accounting for its loyalty in
internal strife. See LEON GOLDSMITH, CYCLE OF FEAR: SYRIA’S ALAWITES IN WAR AND PEACE
(2015).
253. Robert D. Storch, The Plague of the Blue Locusts: Police Reform and Popular Resistance in
Northern England 1840-1857, 20 INT’L REV. SOC. HIST. 61, 81 (1975).
254. See, e.g., Sharon Erickson Nepstad, Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical
Role of Military-Opposition Alliances, 17 SWISS POL. SCI. REV. 485 (2011).
255. Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS: ESSAYS, APHORISMS, AUTOBI-
OGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 277, 283-84 (Peter Demetz ed., Edmund Jephcott trans., 1986).
256. In his view, a post-war peace treaty is essentially an occurrence of law creation
through violence. Id.
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function vis-a`-vis the state’s citizenry through general conscription.257 The
police, conversely, combine these two functions. In obvious cases, the po-
lice employ coercion to preserve law; however, since the police operate in
the vanishing point of written law’s coercive power, it necessarily operates
in ambiguous situations, thus effectively creating new law.258 In other
words, the creation of new law by police action is a creation of the new
normal.
The normalizing aspect of police also clarifies the impact of the
friend/enemy distinction described above. For this distinction to hold, the
possibility of combat must be normalized: it must “remain a real possibility
for as long as the concept of the enemy remains valid.”259 It is obvious,
therefore, that as much as militarization becomes normalized and open-
ended, and as more traditional police units exhibit militarization, their ex-
cluding effect becomes more entrenched. Conversely, deploying special
units for specific tasks, for a limited time in exceptional conditions, might
result only in a temporary effect.
In sum, the key difference between police and military can be de-
scribed by reference to the inclusionary versus exclusionary symbolic
power of these two organs of State coercion. The military symbolism im-
plies a friend/enemy distinction; when militarization specifically affects the
police, the danger of normalization of the distinction is amplified. It is in
this sense that militarization of police normalizes the exception.
V. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
In this Part, we address several possible objections to our theoretical
case against militarization. The first objection is factual and comparative: it
points out that, in fact, militarized police forces of various types have been
acceptable in some of the world’s most well-established democracies. We
then consider three instrumental objections, which make the claim that
our argument is trumped by the benefits reaped by militarization. First,
that militarization protects police officers. Second, that militarization de-
ters unlawful acts. And third, that militarization increases the sense of se-
curity of the public at large. Finally, the last objection we attend to
concerns our idea of militarization as a symbolic process and argues that if
so, normalization will eventually neutralize the exclusionary effect of mili-
tarization. We believe these objections ultimately fail.
257. Id. at 284.
258. Id. at 286-87.
259. SCHMITT, supra note 227, at 33.
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A. Established Democracies in fact have “Hybrid” Militarized Forces
A possible challenge to our theory emanates from the existence of
two types of “hybrid” forces.260 The first is the (mainly) Continental Eu-
ropean phenomenon of units formally belonging to the military but
charged with wide policing duties. The most famous examples of such
units are the French National Gendarmerie261 and the Italian Royal
Carabinieri,262 or the Spanish Guardia Civil.263  Such forces act as law en-
forcement agencies, but can also be deployed externally, in some form,
during armed conflict.264 They are therefore doubly affiliated with minis-
tries of defense and of interior.265 If established democracies use such
forces for public order, does our theory of militarization and exclusion still
stand?
Four reasons lead us to answer in the affirmative. First, historically,
these forces are remnants of old authoritarian regimes—both in form and
in attitudes to policing—and therefore cannot be celebrated as particularly
democratic institutions.266 Second, and more importantly, both the Gen-
darmerie and the Carabinieri for instance, predate the modern French and
Italian states—the former established in 1720 and the latter in 1814.267 As
troubling as that may be in theoretical terms, in our view, the focus should
be less on the historical existence of grandfathered paramilitary police
forces in various countries, but rather on the process of militarization of
previously “civilian” forces.268 Third, it should be noted that in any case,
even formal military police, in actuality, don more “traditional” police
260. See generally Derek Lutterbeck, Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda
and the Rise of Gendarmeries, 29 COOPERATION & CONF. 45 (2004).
261. See French National Gendarmerie, FIEP: ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN AND MEDITER-
RANEAN GENDARMERIES AND POLICE FORCES WITH MILITARY STATUS, http://www.fiep.org/
member-forces/french-national-gendarmerie/.
262. Carabinieri, FIEP: ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN GENDARMER-
IES AND POLICE FORCES WITH MILITARY STATUS, http://www.fiep.org/member-forces/
italian-carabinieri/; see also Lutterbeck, supra note 260, at 47-48.
263. See GUARDIA CIVIL, http://www.guardiacivil.es/en/index.html.
264. Lutterbeck, supra note 260, at 47; see also Bolduc, supra note 144, at 283-85.
265. Lutterbeck, supra note 260, at 47.
266. Indeed, the traditional approach to Police in the Continent has been dubbed “classic
Continental authoritarian policing.” One of the characteristics of such police was “a strong
association with military or military derived models of organization and operations. See JOSE
RAYMUND CANOY, THE DISCREET CHARM OF THE POLICE STATE: THE LANDPOLIZEI AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF BAVARIA 1945-1965 4-5 (2007); cf. Lutterbeck, supra note 260, at
50-51. In this context, Schmitt argued that in contrast to Britain, continental states, to a large
degree, adopted Hobbesian authoritarianism. See CARL SCHMITT, THE LEVIATHAN IN THE
STATE THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES: MEANING AND FAILURE OF A POLITICAL SYMBOL 79-80
(George Schwab & Erna Hilfstein trans., 1996) (1938).
267. See FIEP, supra note 261; FIEP supra note 262.
268. Of course, such forces do affect society. See, e.g., Rene´e Zauberman, The French
Gendarmerie: Crossing Sociological and Historical Perspectives, 5 CRIME, HIST. & SOC. 149 (2001).
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appearance when acting for public order.269 Fourth, it seems that there is
some tendency in Continental Europe to (at least formally) civilianize
paramilitary police.270 Thus, Germany, for instance, gradually civilianized
its cold-war era paramilitary Federal Border Guard (now Federal Po-
lice).271 Greece disbanded the Hellenic Gendarmerie after the fall of the
dictatorship.272 Belgium demilitarized its gendarmerie in 1992,273 and
Austria did so in 2005.274
The second hybrid force is “border police” or border guards, which
are forces charged with national border control.275 Sometimes these agen-
cies formally belong to the police or other civilian agency.276 Especially in
non-peaceful borders, these forces are characterized by their heightened
militarization.277 Arguably, the prevalence of such forces challenges our
distinction between military and police action and symbolism. However,
upon close look, militarized border police actually strengthen our argu-
ment. This is because they are acting on the border: their “target” is exter-
nal to begin with - meaning their militarization signifies the exclusion of
those beyond the border.278
269. See Gendarmerie Mobile, http://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/Medias-ou-outils
/Galeries/Videos/Gendarmerie-mobile/Gendarmerie-mobile.
270. See, e.g., Gorazd Mes˘ko et al., Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Past, Present and
Future Prospects, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLICE AND POLICING 606, 612 (Michael D.
Reisig & Robert J. Kane eds., 2014); Lutterbeck, supra note 260, at 47 (noting that over time, all
these forces have undergone a process of “demilitarization”).
271. See KIM EDUARAD LIOE, ARMED FORCES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS:
THE GERMAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 20-22 (2011).
272. See generally Konstantinos Douvlis & Nigel South, Police Reform and Social Change in
Greece: the Development and Merger of the Gendarmerie and Urban Police Forces, 67 REVIJA ZA
KRIMINALISTIKO IN KRIMINOLOGIJO 289 (2016).
273. Marleen Easton, Reconsidering the Process of Demilitarization: The Case of the Belgian
Gendarmerie, 4 ASIAN POLICING 19 (2006).
274. Mes˘ko et al., supra note 270, at 612.
275. See Lutterbeck, supra note 260, at 51-60.
276. Such is the case of Israel’s “Border Police.” See Tal Misgav, Israel’s Border Police, 17
INNOVATION EXCHANGE 20 (2014), http://mops.gov.il/Documents/Publications/
InformationCenter/Innovation%20Exchange/Innovation%20Exchange%2017/Innovation_Ex
change_17.pdf.
277. Id. at 21–22.
278. Interestingly, this is concretely reflected in Israel’s border police, who wear green
berets to physically symbolize the border, known as the “green line.” Id. at 21. For these and
other reasons, it seems the German Constitution, for instance, limits the internal use of Federal
Border Police only to particular cases of necessity. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW]  Arts.
35(2); 91, 115f, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html.
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B. Self-Protection of Police Officers
A second objection argues that militarization makes police safer, as
they are better able to protect themselves.279 Indeed, advocates of militari-
zation might claim that military equipment, such as armored personnel
carriers, is only used to defend and not attack; and that despite the poten-
tial to inflict violence, police act with the utmost discretion to minimize
the use of force.
Two responses are available. First, at bottom this is an empirical argu-
ment. Whether in general militarization makes police safer is a matter of
dispute. For instance, while militarization allows police to respond more
forcefully to violence, it is just as likely that militarization might provoke
graver violent resistance to begin with. As we pointed out earlier, this
“arms race,” if you will, characterized the “war on drugs:”280 the deploy-
ment of militarized police might incentivize criminals to organize and arm
themselves in a manner that will allow them to counter militarized forces.
Thus, the instrumental argument does not seem determinative.
A second response is principled. Even if militarization did make po-
lice safer (which is disputed), one can argue that as a point of departure, a
police force can only make itself safer to a certain extent. Police assume a
special role in society, which requires them to assume some form of risk.
Indeed, if police were not required to take any risk, they would have not
been required to use force only as a last resort but could act preventively.
As David Luban points out, “[s]ome professions [such as police] include
risk taking in their vocational core.”281 This role-based requirement for
risk-taking ascends from their consent to become police officers but also
descends as an inherent part of their professionalism.282 This is precisely
the substance of the common police motto, “to protect and to serve.”
Protection inherently means assuming risk for the sake of another, or for a
greater good. It follows that police cannot follow “zero-risk” policy, but
rather, the question is one of proper balance.283 We can therefore legiti-
mately ask whether militarization, to the extent that it reduces some risk
to police, can be justifiable in light of the considerations detailed above.
279. For instance, in the Orlando shooting of June 2016, a Kevlar helmet was said to save
one officer’s life. See Lizette Alvarez & Richard Pe´rez-Pen˜a. Orlando Gunman Attacks Gay Night-
club, Leaving 50 Dead, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/13/us/
orlando-nightclub-shooting.html.
280. See supra Section II.
281. David Luban, Risk Taking and Force Protection, in READING WALZER 277, 286 (Yitzhak
Benbaji & Naomi Sussmann eds., 2014).
282. Id. at 286.
283. In this sense, it is generally agreed that even soldiers at war cannot fight in a “zero-
casualty” mode, and that some risk-taking is required also when fighting wars – the question is
only the level of risk. Id. at 286-87.
150 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 23:105
C. Militarized Police Deters Unlawful Acts
A further argument for militarization concerns deterrence. Indeed,
some proponents of militarization may argue that militarized police forces
may deter criminal and terrorist activity.284 However, this claim is also
unconvincing, both on the instrumental and principled levels. First, it is
empirically unclear whether militarization deters crime. Indeed, it seems
that criminals that would be willing to use the type of violence that milita-
rization wishes to deter—for instance terrorists—are unlikely to be de-
terred from such forces to begin with.
Moreover, the problem with arguments for deterrence is that they are
inherently vague, are impossible to validate, and as such can be used to
justify almost everything.285 The same forces that might deter criminals
can easily be used in practice to deter legitimate dissent through pretext.286
Even if such abuse does not take place, a “chilling effect” might occur, as
“[t]he very essence of a chilling effect is an act of deterrence.”287 There-
fore, the mere presence of intimidating militarized forces, originally meant
to deter criminals, might effectively deter individuals that seek to engage in
legitimate activities.
However, to us, the key problem with the argument from deterrence
in the context of militarization is a principled one. We should ask those
who invoke deterrence, what is the “or what?” that underlies the presence
of militarized forces? In other words, what is the stick with which the
potential perpetrator is threatened by such forces? In the context of war, it
is clear that the threat is death and destruction.288 In such cases, demon-
stration of military capacity might be understandable.289 However, in the
context of law enforcement, the stick of deterrence must be in the form of
284. For instance, one commentator argued that militarization “shows that we are
strong . . . We can respond by using pervasive weapons and better equipment. That is the sym-
bolic effect.” See Volker Wagener, Germany’s New Anti-Terror Units: A Paramilitary Excess? DW
(Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-new-anti-terror-units-a-paramilitary-
excess/a-19010175.
285. See, in another context, Eliav Lieblich, House Demolitions 2.0, JUST SECURITY (Dec.
18. 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/28415/house-demolitions-2-0/.
286. See Glenn Greenwald, The Militarization of U.S. Police: Finally Dragged into the Light by
the Horrors of Ferguson, THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 14., 2014), https://theintercept.com/2014/08/14/
militarization-u-s-police-dragged-light-horrors-ferguson/.
287. Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 58
B.U. L. REV. 685, 689 (1978).
288. ANDREW HEYWOOD, KEY CONCEPTS IN POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS 53 (2nd ed., 2015).
289. However, it should be added that even during armed conflict, deterrence in the form
of a threat-to-kill is recognizable as a valid objective versus armed enemies; it cannot be aimed at
the civilian population. See Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War (Geneva IV) art. 33, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (“all measures of
intimidation [against protected persons] . . . are prohibited”).
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justice, meaning arrest, trial, and punishment in line with due process.290
Deterrence by militarized police conflates the two: it applies to law en-
forcement deterrence the logic of war deterrence. It conveys to the policed
community not the message that if you commit a crime, justice will be
meted out; but rather, that if you transgress, you might encounter extreme,
possibly deadly violence. It becomes clear that such perception of deter-
rence is unacceptable in a rule of law society.
D. Increasing the Sense of Security
A further objection could be that even if all else fails, militarization
enhances the “sense of security” of the public. The public sees militarized
forces and is reassured that the State is strong and able to protect it, and
thus the system’s legitimacy is strengthened.
This argument fails for several reasons. Key among them is the fallacy
found at the basis of broad policies which aim to achieve a subjective sense
of security through preventive actions. Indeed, when a state adopts policies
based on the presumption that its civilians are threatening, it actually
defeats itself. Peter Ramsay convincingly identified an ongoing process
whereby States attempt to ensure not only the physical security of their
citizenry, but also their subjective sense of security. The problem, accord-
ing to Ramsay, is that when doing so, the State admits its inability to
provide a sense of security normally; thus, paradoxically, the State becomes
an insecurity State.291 In Ramsay’s words, such actions are nothing but “an
authoritative statement of law’s lack of authority.”292 In our context, de-
ploying militarized forces because of a presumption of threat amounts to
an admission by the State of law’s general inefficacy, of the general anxiety
of the citizenry, and the its own authority deficit.293 When militarizing
police, the State essentially concedes that its citizens – and even, perhaps,
its police – are insecure within their own polity. This of course only gen-
erates more subjective insecurity:294 when the presumption of threat con-
structs some citizens as threatening-if-not-proven-otherwise, it
simultaneously constructs others as potential victims.295
290. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 30 –31
(1998); but see Samuel J. Rascoff, Counterterrorism and New Deterrence, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 830
(2014) (pointing out the role of “new deterrence” in light of contemporary counter-terrorism
measures).
291. RAMSAY, supra note 6, at 5-6, 215-19, 226-27.
292. Id. at 217.
293. In Ramsay’s terms, “hollow sovereignty.” Id. 215-19.
294. Id. at 226 (“there is bound to be an element of self-fulfilling prophecy when it is the
organs of the state that doubt their own authority.”).
295. Cf. id. at 229, 232 (arguing that “post-democratic” politics “constructs citizens as
either vulnerable to predatory threats or as the source of those threats, as if they were the subjects
of the state of nature;” and that under the “insecurity state,” [e]ither we are potential crime
victims marked by our vulnerability or we are threats. . . or conceivably we are both”). In a sense,
the presumption of threat internalizes the logic of terrorism: terrorist tactics – say, the use of
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Even if we would assume militarization could instill some sense of
security among certain (privileged) segments of society, this would hardly
change our conclusion. As we established earlier, normalizing militariza-
tion assumes threat, implies a friend/enemy distinction, and therefore ex-
cludes the policed community. Now, assuming that militarized police are
not deployed everywhere but selectively,296 the “sense of security” of
community X must be achieved at the expense of the exclusion of com-
munity Y. The only way to counter this problem would be to deploy
militarized police always and everywhere. In such an attempt to uphold
formal equality, the state would complete the merger between democracy
and totalitarianism, norm and exception.
E. If Militarization Becomes Normalized,
It Would Cease to be Excluding
A related counterargument claims the following: if we are correct
that militarization is a symbolic process, then can’t it be said that once
normalized, the excluding power of the symbol is diminished? In other
words, once militarization becomes normal, it loses its power to exclude
since there will no longer be an alternative cultural backdrop to which to
compare it. So, to speak, if it “excludes” everyone, it excludes no one.
While this argument makes sense theoretically, it ultimately fails to
convince. This is because the alternative cultural backdrop would disappear
if and only if all police forces, wherever they are deployed, become milita-
rized. As long as in certain contexts “civilian” police are still deployed, the
relative difference will continue to generate the exclusionary effect con-
cerning those communities which face militarized units.297 Since, as we
highlighted above, selective deployment is part and parcel of the phenome-
non of police militarization, it is highly unlikely that in the foreseeable
future this relative difference will disappear, and so its power to exclude
will remain.
CONCLUSION
Like other situations in which measures that were once designed for
the exceptional case become normalized, the discussion of police militari-
zation is preoccupied with instrumental arguments. When engaged in such
arguments, we frequently lose sight of the larger principled issue at hand.
suicide bombers in public transportation– aim to instill a presumption that fellow individuals are
threatening. When states respond in-kind by adopting preventive and collective measures, they
adopt this logic precisely.
296. Compare Bill Ong Hing, From Ferguson to Palestine: Disrupting Race-Based Policing, 59
HOWARD L. J. 559 (2016); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 15, at 5.
297. This could be looked at as a case of “relative deprivation.” For the classic definition
see TED ROBERT GURR, WHY MEN REBEL Ch. 2 (40th Ann. Ed. 2015).
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As this Article demonstrated, the principled problem of police milita-
rization is not found in its actual use of military-style violence, but rather
in the presumption of threat that it implies. The presumption of threat,
manifested symbolically through the tacit acknowledgment that the possi-
bility of combat is constantly present, carves out a domestic enemy, one
which is excluded from the political order. Since this distinction is carried
out by the police, which is an organ of the normal, rather than the excep-
tional, legal regime, the distinction has an especially powerful potential to
normalize and solidify this exclusion. This is what underlies the strong
objections to such forces among policed communities.
